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China está deviniendo “más dispuesta y capacitada” para implantar y defender sus intereses de ultramar

Debido a su expansión global los intereses militares de China también se expanden. En su primer “libro blanco” sobre estrategia militar, el gobierno de ese país explicita su propósito de defender sus intereses más allá de sus fronteras en un rango creciente de temas y de geografía.

[The Big Story Behind China's New Military Strategy](#)

China is becoming “more willing and able” to stake and defend its interests overseas.

By Alexander Sullivan and Andrew S. Erickson

The Diplomat – 05/06/2015

As China reemerges as one of the globe's leading powers, just what type of actor it will be on the world stage has become a subject of intense debate among China watchers and the broader public. With tensions rising to what one eminent China scholar has called a “tipping point” in U.S.-China relations, the Chinese government released its first-ever white paper on military strategy just before the fourteenth annual Shangri-La Dialogue was held in Singapore this past weekend. Since 2012, Beijing has indeed become more assertive in proximate waters, and the paper underscores determination to strengthen Chinese “strategic management of the sea.” Attention has rightly focused on expressions of Chinese resolve with respect to current points of contention such as China's land reclamation on disputed features in the South China Sea. Most recently – following Pentagon predictions – China's Coast Guard appears to be increasing activity near Luconia Shoals, roughly 60 miles north of Borneo in Malaysia's exclusive economic zone. But the strategic thinking just published also reflects a much larger story of profound changes in Chinese foreign policy.

The story itself is relatively simple: China's participation in globalization has catalyzed an irreversible explosion of overseas interests. It has also afforded China greater resources and capabilities with which to advance and defend them. This combination has drawn China inexorably outward to become “more willing and able” – that is, active in international security affairs. In fact in many ways, China's first-ever defense white paper on strategy is official policy catching up to reality. Because this trend is likely only to intensify, U.S. scholars and policymakers must understand it if they are to shape policies that can seize the benefits and manage the challenges stemming from China's new normal of increasing international security activism.

In particular, “China’s Military Strategy” publicly articulates innovations in China’s national security thinking in three key areas: a new understanding of the political framework for military force, enhanced security partnerships, and global power projection capabilities for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Because the drivers for this strategy are baked into globalization, several of these ideas predate the current administration, dating to Hu Jintao’s 2004 call for “new historic missions”; but they are ratified and given sharper emphasis here. For this reason, they are likely also to outlast Chinese President Xi Jinping’s tenure in office. Taken together, this strategy augurs a China that will be much more active globally on security issues.

New Global Scope

Politically, the white paper asserts a new global scope for China’s security interests and new flexibility in protecting them. We are told that, “the national security issues facing China encompass far more subjects, extend over a greater range, and cover a longer time span than at any time in the country’s history.” Beijing is cluing domestic and international audiences into the new, open-ended baseline for its involvement in security affairs, which reflects the reality of its global economic and political interests.

Specific emphasis is placed on the security of access to overseas energy and resources, the people and infrastructure that support that access, and the sea lanes that those raw materials traverse. The strategy calls for China to participate in “jointly securing international [sea lines of communication].” This is eminently sensible for a country that, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, imports nearly 60 percent of its oil – a proportion that has doubled since the year 2000 and which is only expected to grow in coming decades.

In order to safeguard these interests, China will take a “holistic view of national security.” One way to interpret this vague expression is that interests will now potentially override old ideologies such as doctrinaire opposition to “interference in the domestic affairs of other countries.” Notably, this is the first time a Chinese defense white paper has made no reference to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the litany of historical PRC dogmas in which noninterference and other self-imposed restrictions are enshrined.

In practice, over the past decade China has already engaged in multiple activities that exceed the bounds of traditional non-interference, including political mediation, unilateral and multilateral economic sanctions, and deployments of its security forces in other countries. It has involved itself in one way or another in Sudan, South Sudan, Libya, Syria, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and other places. In recent months alone, Chinese has dispatched naval vessels into Yemen’s territorial waters to evacuate Chinese nationals from escalating chaos and hosted peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban in China. Official policy is catching up to deep structural changes and the improvisations they have demanded.

The so-called “holistic view of national security” encompasses both traditional and nontradi-

tional security, and China states unequivocally its intention to address threats occurring well beyond its borders, such as piracy, peacekeeping, disaster response, and terrorism. China's approach to these issues will emphasize international cooperation of the kind demonstrated by its naval deployments to the Gulf of Aden for antipiracy operations beginning in 2008. Overall, China promises to "shoulder more international responsibilities and obligations, provide more public security goods, and contribute more to world peace and common development."

Military Partnerships

Indeed, the second major innovation in China's new strategy is the deep recognition that China cannot operate globally without help from other countries. This strategy document, particularly compared with previous defense white papers, envisions robust strategic and operational military partnerships with the United States, Russia, and other nations spanning Europe, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific. There are also aspirations to "establish fair and effective collective security mechanisms," continue increasing China's voice in multilateral security dialogues, and participate more in cooperative security actions.

Beyond reinforcing the message of China's peaceful rise, deeper cooperation provides much-needed operational experience for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the form of joint exercises or multilateral deployments, and may provide access to advanced technology, training, or even access arrangements to facilitate distant operations, such as the recently reported potential basing agreement with Djibouti.

Again, in this case the emphasis on security ties reflects the reality that China – hungry for friends following its relative isolation prior to the 2000s – has in recent years deepened its defense relationships worldwide. Beijing now has "strategic partnerships" or similar umbrella ties with nearly 60 countries across the globe, and under these frameworks defense diplomacy with key states has risen dramatically. PLA Navy (PLAN) ships now routinely visit ports around Asia, the Indian Ocean region, the Middle East, and the coast of East Africa. The PLA has also instituted joint exercises with Russia, Pakistan, and Singapore, and routinely seeks additional opportunities. Commercial interests also support deepened ties: China is now the world's third-leading exporter of arms, and is selling ever more sophisticated systems.

In many cases, China will be seeking to strengthen ties with countries that already enjoy robust security cooperation with the United States, such as Saudi Arabia. Yet the pursuit of partners may also bring China into closer alignment with states like Iran and Russia, whose relationship with Washington is more fractious. Additional points of strategic interaction create the potential for both increased cooperation and competition.

Projecting Power

In its most forward-leaning innovation, "China's Military Strategy" also signals that Beijing will

put steel behind its willingness to do more and court new partners. China intends to build military forces that are capable of limited power projection across domains. The headline for this modernization program is a move from “near seas defense” to “the combination of ‘near seas defense’ and ‘far seas protection,’” which suggests the need to develop a limited blue water navy.

Simultaneously, China has set other crucial goals in the air and other domains. Indeed, the PLA has already made headway across nearly all key determinants of expeditionary military power and has much room to grow if, as this strategy suggests, resources will continue to flow. A two-year study from the Center for a New American Security that the authors of this piece helped write analyzed the PLA’s inchoate power projection in five key areas: force projection, sustainment, capacity, command and control, and force protection. Each is a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective use of military power far away from one’s shores. China’s new strategy calls out each category as a specific goal across different domains.

Force projection is a broad term in military jargon, but here it means expeditionary capabilities: naval and air platforms that can operate at and deliver effects over long ranges and other capabilities in rangeless domains like cyberspace. Many visible examples of this trend, especially China’s developing aircraft carrier program, have filled headlines in recent years. The strategy aims for the PLAN to “build a combined, multi-functional and efficient marine combat force structure” for use on the high seas. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) aims to build capabilities for “air strike,” “airborne operations,” “strategic projection,” and other types of expeditionary airpower. The PLA missile forces, known as the Second Artillery Force, will also work toward “medium- and long-range precision strikes.” Even the lumbering PLA Army has set its sights on “multi-dimensional, trans-theater, multi-functional” operations. In many cases, platforms that can perform these missions are already in development or production.

Sustainment is the provision of strategic lift, logistics, and personnel services required to maintain operations. The new strategy states that “China’s armed forces will deepen logistics reform in relevant policies, institutions and support forces, and optimize strategic logistics deployment,” including “comprehensive support” for the navy and air force, “sustainable [Army] operations,” and mobility across the board. The PLAN’s experience operating far afield in the Gulf of Aden has made the larger institution keenly aware of the need for a global logistics infrastructure. It is building the platforms – plus, as mentioned above, potential foreign facility access agreements – to realize one.

Capacity denotes the sophistication and scale at which a military can operate. It is undergirded by both requisite amounts of human and material assets and the organizational processes to generate military power effectively. In the past decade, China has done a remarkable job of churning out increasingly sophisticated weapons: According to the Office of Naval Intelligence, “During 2014 alone, more than 60 naval ships and craft were laid down, launched, or commis-

sioned, with a similar number expected through the end of 2015.” Sustaining and even increasing this pace across the services, and ensuring effective management of assets across their life cycles, requires better strategic management. Thus, the PLA will “optimize the functions and institutions of the [Central Military Commission] and the general headquarters/departments, improve the leadership and management system of the services and arms, and adhere to demand-based planning and plan-based resource allocation.” Many of these organizational reforms will be politically difficult, but the inclusion of these benchmarks in a public document displays some level of confidence by the top leadership.

Command and control (C2) comprises the facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations. The anti-access/area denial capabilities that the Pentagon now confronts in the Western Pacific include many C2 architectures that can be usefully developed further and applied to extended operations. The new strategy doubles down on the “further exploration and more efficient utilization of information resources,” especially with space-based satellites and cyber capabilities. As important as technology are professional military personnel who can use those tools to the greatest effect. China will thus “perfect the system for military human resources,” “[enhance] realistic military training,” and make efforts to develop strategic leaders that can adapt to the constantly shifting demands of military operations. Overall, it aims to “gradually establish an integrated joint operational system in which all elements are seamlessly linked and various operational platforms perform independently and in coordination.”

Finally, force protection refers to preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information. Operating far from one’s shores carries with it myriad vulnerabilities; this strategy recognizes those shortfalls and aims to remedy them. Naval and air modernization plans refer to “comprehensive defense” as a key priority, and indeed the PLAN already operates sophisticated Luyang-II and -III area air defense destroyers and is working to mitigate its traditional Achilles’ heel in open-ocean anti-submarine warfare, both key parts of force protection at sea.

The PLA will continue to face severe obstacles in nearly all of these areas, but should it make progress on the ambitions laid out in this strategy – many of which are already in motion – it will have the building blocks of a serious expeditionary military force. Furthermore, given the inexorable growth of its overseas interests, barring a drastic domestic crisis China is unlikely to stop at “far seas protection.”

We and our colleagues assess that by 2030 the PLA will have achieved “limited expeditionary” status. While by no means approaching the capabilities of the U.S. Navy to engage in high-intensity operations globally, such a force could conduct a range of missions across the globe, to include: major humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, contested noncombatant evacuation operations, securing high-value assets such as North Korean nuclear weapons, defense of critical

sea lanes, counterterrorism strikes, and limited stabilization operations.

New Normal

“China’s Military Strategy” is an ambitious vision for greater involvement in global security affairs commensurate with China’s renewed great power status and now-indelible interests on every continent. Absent a major conflict in Asia or discontinuous change in China itself, this is the new normal. Beijing is already working toward an expeditionary military and playing an active role in security issues beyond historically significant concerns such as Taiwan or the near seas.

Fortunately, this more willing and able Beijing does not demand a wholesale rethink of the United States’ decades-old China policy, but merely an expanded, refined perspective. A global China will both present new opportunities for cooperation and accentuate areas of competition. The United States thus needs to widen the aperture of its three-pillar approach to China – engagement, shaping, and balancing – to account for the new scale and scope of China’s international security activism. With “China’s Military Strategy,” Beijing has published its part of the playbook; Washington must now formulate its response before the game is in full swing.

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US vs. China: ¿es la nueva Guerra Fría?

El avance de China en el Mar del Sur de China generando quejas de países como Vietnam y Filipinas, pero la acción no es completamente ilegal. Como China, otros países reclaman soberanía en la zona. China desafía la supremacía de EE.UU. en la zona y el país americano no puede hacer mucho.

[US v China: is this the new cold war?](#)

The Chinese programme of island reclamation is testing America’s reach

By David Pilling

Financial Times – 10/6/2015

Strange things are happening in the South China Sea. In the past 18 months, Beijing has reclaimed 2,000 acres of land, converting several submerged reefs and rocks into fully fledged “islands”. Beijing’s land-reclamation efforts have dwarfed those of other countries, notably the Philippines and Vietnam, which have rival claims to the nearby Spratly Islands. China is also constructing piers, harbours and multistorey buildings (though there is no Fifa football stadium yet). On Fiery Cross Reef, in the Spratly Islands, it has built a 3km runway capable of handling all the military aircraft at Beijing’s disposal.

The splurge of activity has set alarm bells ringing. This month, in a speech in Tokyo, Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino, president of the Philippines, likened China’s activity to Nazi Germany’s annexation of Czechoslovakia. Ashton Carter, US defence secretary, called Chinese actions “out of step” with international norms. The US, he said, would “fly, sail and operate” wherever international law allowed. He explicitly denied that the act of “turning an underwater rock into an airfield” conferred any rights of sovereignty or restricted any other nation’s right of sea or air passage. China and other claimants, he said, should immediately cease all land reclamation.

That begs the question: what is the US going to do about it? The short answer may be not much. The US continues to fly military planes near the new islands. It and other nations are stepping up military co-operation in an effort to show a united front. Yet China’s island reclamation programme has proceeded apace. Mr Carter’s words sound like President Barack Obama’s “red line” in Syria. If Beijing continues to call Washington’s bluff, the truth will be out: the US speaks loudly but carries a small stick.

Why is it so hard for Washington to act? For one thing, though Beijing’s actions may not be in the spirit of co-operation, neither are they overtly illegal. Both the Philippines and Vietnam have also reclaimed land. China has merely done so on an industrial scale. Nor is China’s claim to the Spratlys entirely spurious, say legal experts. True, the islands are closer to the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia, three of the other claimants (along with Brunei). Yet proximity is not always decisive as Argentina can testify in relation to its dispute with the UK over the Falklands/Malvinas. Finally, China is not obviously threatening freedom of navigation. It does seek to restrict military activity within claimed territorial waters. That may contravene international law, although the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea says military activity – such as surveillance – should be carried out with “due regard” to the rights of the relevant coastal state. Where China is clearly trying it on is its effort to extend such restrictions to artificial islands. When the US flew a P-8 Poseidon aircraft near a new island recently, the Chinese navy told it to clear off.

Further reading

Again, it boils down to what the US is prepared to do about it. It says it is considering sending warships within 12 miles of China’s new creations. Having made that threat, it may very well feel obliged to carry it through. China, though, is not powerless to respond. It could send in its

own warships. If it really wants to up the ante, it could declare an air defence identification zone over all or part of the South China Sea, theoretically obliging incoming aircraft to report their presence to Beijing.

If China and the US are engaged in a game of bluff, the suspicion is that China may have more stomach for the fight. Its tactic is to pick quarrels over seemingly small-bore matters that individually are not worth shedding blood over. Yet collectively, almost imperceptibly, they advance China's ambition to challenge US "primacy" in the region. Hugh White, an Australian academic, says China is cutting "very thin slices of a very long sausage". Xi Jinping has already told us what the sausage looks like. China's president has pressed for a new type of "great power relationship" that would bring Beijing greater respect – and power – in Asia. That does not threaten US primacy globally, but it does challenge it in Asia, where China wants to be treated as an equal, at least.

Beijing's actions in the South China Sea are an important part of that strategy. As Carl Thayer, a security expert at the University of New South Wales, writes: "China has changed 'facts on the ground' and presented the region with a fait accompli". The problem with faits accomplis – as Washington is discovering – is that you can't do anything about them.

El mercado chino sigue siendo atractivo para los inversores externos

La caída en el crecimiento y el aumento de los costos laborales redujeron la confianza de los inversores externos, pero muchos inversores toman en cuenta las oportunidades del creciente mercado doméstico.

[Xinhua Insight: Chinese market still attractive to foreign investors](#)

English.news.cn – Ningbo – 09/06/2015

China's economic slowdown and rising labor costs haven't dampened foreign investors' confidence in the world's second largest economy.

Many foreign investors are upbeat over the opportunities afforded by the growing domestic

market for consumption, according to a report released by the Department of Commerce of Zhejiang Province and the Financial Times on Tuesday.

The growing domestic market has emerged as the top attraction for foreign investors, with a

stable policy environment and sound industrial infrastructure also bolstering confidence, the report found after interviewing 150 senior managers from foreign companies.

“There is no doubt that China is entering a new phase of development with slower growth, but that does not necessarily mean that there are no investment opportunities. The emerging domestic market for consumption is one feature of China’s new normal growth and is open for foreign investment,” said Yu Bin, a senior researcher with the State Council’s Development and Research Center.

Yu added that China’s opening up projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, offer foreign companies entry points for cooperation along the upper part of the global industrial value chain.

About 44.6 percent of the surveyed companies said that they would increase investment in China this year, citing the attraction of high-end manufacturing, and goods and services for domestic consumers.

The report found that foreign investors felt that headway achieved by the government to improve and streamline processes was the most remarkable progress last year.

The Ministry of Commerce said last month that its major tasks in 2015 included pushing for opening up, cutting red tape around foreign investment and developing pilot projects on liberalized trade restrictions.

“It is probably the best time ever to invest in China because it is more predicable and easier to understand the market dynamics. We can understand the government policies better than we did ten years ago and it’s easier to make long-term plans,” said E. Allan Gabor, president and CEO of Merck Serono China, a German pharmaceutical company, which has a R&D center in Beijing and is building its second largest plant in the eastern city of Nantong.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) to the Chinese mainland jumped 11.3 percent year on year in the first three months of 2015 to 34.88 billion U.S. dollars.

During the same period, China’s growth slowed to 7 percent year on year, the lowest quarterly growth rate since 2009, prompting concerns of possible capital outflows.

“The ups and downs of these economic numbers, if seen from a long-term perspective, are just bumps in the road for China as it goes from a low-cost production country to a high-end innovation country,” said Edward Buckingham, a management professor with the University of Nottingham Ningbo China.

The report pointed out that a lack of talents in may hinder economic growth and called for more targeted investment policies and sophisticated services to meet foreign investors’ demands.

“Developing an innovative market environment relies on the education and training of talents, and promotion of entrepreneurialism. High-tech startups are on the rise here, and they are not just copying other countries’ or companies’ ideas, but making their own. This is a positive trend,” Buckingham said.

Inversiones de China y EEUU, lejos de representar conflicto son “complementarias”

Xinhuanet – Nueva York – 16/06/2015

China y Estados Unidos, las dos mayores economías del mundo, se encuentran entre los 10 principales inversionistas extranjeros en África, pero su inversión en el continente “no representa un conflicto”, sino que “es complementaria” en muchos casos, dijo a Xinhua un experto.

James Newlands, un destacado experto con más de 33 años de experiencia en el ámbito de inversiones en África, hizo los comentarios sobre la presentación del informe anual del estudio de atractivo de África, el quinto consecutivo que será presentado el lunes por EY, un líder mundial en servicios de seguros, impuestos, transacciones y asesoría.

Sus declaraciones ayudan a reprimir el llamado “nuevo colonialismo”, la acusación de que China explota los recursos de África, dado que China ha hecho grandes esfuerzos para ayudar al desarrollo del continente y beneficiar a sus habitantes. En las últimas décadas, China ha mantenido la práctica de no fijar ataduras políticas a las ayudas e inversiones en África.

Newlands, un sudafricano a cargo de dirigir la ejecución del Plan de Inversión en África de EY en los últimos cuatro años, dijo que China y Estados Unidos se encuentran entre los 10 principales países con mayor inversión extranjera directa (IED) en África, en términos de número de proyectos de IED, valor de capital y empleos creados.

China disfruta de un mejor posicionamiento en términos de valor de capital y empleos creados, señaló el experto.

En términos de número de proyectos de IED, “Estados Unidos es el inversionista número uno de cualquier país en el mundo, con 13,8 por ciento de los proyectos de IED procedentes de Estados Unidos”, dijo Newlands.

No son conflictivas, sino complementarias

En cuanto a la inversión en África tanto de China como de Estados Unidos, Newlands indicó que “no creo que haya conflictos”.

“Si analizan las necesidades que África tiene o las necesidades no satisfechas de la población, hay oportunidades más que suficientes para todos los inversionistas”, dijo el experto. “No veo una gran competencia, es decir, de que estas oportunidades sean tomadas y ya no estén a disposición. Hay oportunidades más que suficientes, por lo que, francamente, las veo como complementarias en muchos casos”.

Hay rasgos comunes entre las inversiones chinas y estadounidenses, dijo el experto, quien añadió que considera a la tecnología, medios y telecomunicaciones como “el principal sector para ambas”.

Otra semejanza es que Sudáfrica “todavía es el principal destino para ambos países”.

En cuanto a las diferencias, Newlands dijo que “lo que vemos es que el ámbito de productos para el consumidor es un sector importante, pero probablemente más para las compañías estadounidenses”.

“Vemos que quizá haya más inversión china en minería y sector automotriz”, indicó el experto. “Más inversión estadounidense en servicios financieros y empresariales. Ahí es donde se ubica la principal diferencia desde una perspectiva por sectores”.

Fuerza conductora

Hay una nueva historia sobre la fuerza conductora detrás de la inversión extranjera en África, cuyo atractivo para las inversiones tradicionalmente eran los recursos, la minería, el gas y el petróleo, indicó Newlands.

“Ahora hay un mercado para los bienes de consumo y otras cosas que los consumidores necesiten” dijo el experto. “De modo que son un montón de tecnología, medios y telecomunicaciones, estos son los sectores que están atrayendo mucho interés, en particular de China y de Estados Unidos”.

La inversión tanto china como estadounidense es necesaria para África y también favorece los intereses de todos los países africanos, dijo Newlands, quien trabaja con cuentas clave de EY en Estados Unidos, a quienes ayuda a desarrollar, someter a pruebas de estrés y ejecutar sus estrategias de crecimiento en África.

Newlands señaló las cinco prioridades que tanto los gobiernos africanos como los inversionistas extranjeros deben atender para lograr el crecimiento económico del continente: valor compartido, asociaciones, infraestructura, integración regional y espíritu emprendedor.

Las ventas online alcanzaron en China los 453.000 millones de dólares

Por Laurie Burkitt y Peter Evans

Dangdai – 17/06/2015

Un artículo de The Wall Street Journal Americas reproducido por La Nación sostiene que “461 millones de consumidores chinos, una tercera parte de la población, hacen compras en línea, frente a 46 millones en 2007” y que el año pasado, “el mercado de comercio electrónico de China creció 49%, después de alzas de 59%, 51% y 70% en los tres años previos, respectivamente. En 2013, China superó a Estados Unidos como el mayor mercado de comercio electrónico y el año pasado registró US\$453.000 millones en ventas en la web, u 11% de todas las ventas minoristas.”

El auge de las compras en línea en China toma por sorpresa a las multinacionales

El fabricante de los jabones Dove, los champúes Lux y las sopas Knorr advirtió en octubre sobre un descenso interanual de 20% en las ventas del tercer trimestre en China. El trimestre siguiente, el gigante anglo-holandés anunció otro declive de 20%.

Unilever lo atribuyó a una desaceleración de la economía china y un repliegue de los consumidores. No obstante, un vistazo a las tendencias de compras minoristas en el gigante asiático sugiere que Unilever también estaba sintiendo el efecto de la migración de cientos de millones de consumidores a Internet.

La multinacional de productos de consumo no fue la única empresa de Occidente en sobrestimar la importancia de las tiendas físicas. La suiza Nestlé SA ha estado quemando café instantáneo que no logró vender en los supermercados. El gigante de alimentos le dijo hace poco a The Wall Street Journal que no logró descifrar la velocidad y la amplitud de los cambios en el sector minorista de China. La estadounidense Colgate-Palmolive Co. y la alemana Beiersdorf AG, dueña de Nivea, también han mencionado problemas de exceso de inventario.

Las empresas de bienes de consumo en general fueron “demasiado lentas a la hora de reaccionar a los cambios en el mercado” chino, señaló en una entrevista en abril Jean-Marc Huët, director financiero de Unilever. El ejecutivo no quiso decir si Unilever había sido más lenta que sus rivales en detectar las tendencias.

El éxodo de las tiendas ha trastornado a minoristas en todo el mundo. El año pasado, el comercio electrónico global superó los US\$1,3 billones. En China, sin embargo, la transición hacia Internet ocurrió con mayor fuerza, en parte debido a la velocidad de penetración de los teléfonos inteligentes.

Se estima que 461 millones de consumidores chinos, una tercera parte de la población, hacen compras en línea, frente a 46 millones en 2007, cuando el comercio electrónico comenzaba a ganar terreno. El año pasado, el mercado de comercio electrónico de China creció 49%, después de alzas de 59%, 51% y 70% en los tres años previos, respectivamente. En 2013, China superó a Estados Unidos como el mayor mercado de comercio electrónico y el año pasado registró US\$453.000 millones en ventas en la web, u 11% de todas las ventas minoristas.

Casi la mitad de todos los consumidores chinos ya compran alimentos por Internet, frente a sólo un cuarto de los consumidores globales, según una encuesta de Nielsen a 30.000 consumidores. El año pasado, 42% de todas las ventas de productos para el cuidado de la piel fueron hechas en línea, indicó la firma de investigación de mercado.

El cambio está repercutiendo a lo largo de China. Centros comerciales como del mercado de electrónicos de Zhongguancun en Beijing, otrora lleno de vendedores ambulantes y compradores, se han vaciado. Algunos analistas advierten sobre una escasez de trabajadores, culpando a las “aldeas Taobao”, donde los residentes que en el pasado habrían ido a las ciudades a ocupar los puestos de trabajadores no calificados se están quedando en casa para operar tiendas en el mercado electrónico de Alibaba Group Holding o hacer

entregas. Alibaba, en tanto, apunta a ofrecer entregas para el siguiente día en 50 ciudades del país para fin de año.

El menguante papel de los grandes minoristas tradicionales perjudica a los gigantes de productos de consumo, que solían dominar las estanterías de las tiendas.

“Queramos o no, el comercio electrónico cambiará nuestro negocio”, dice Reinhold Jakobi, director gerente de alimentos y bebidas de Nestlé China. “Si vas a la web, todos reciben el mismo espacio en la pantalla”.

Lai Yan, investigadora de 26 años de una consultora de tecnología de Beijing, dice que ahora compra todo en línea, con excepción de sus productos alimenticios. Cuando iba a las tiendas, solía preferir el champú Pantene, de Procter & Gamble Co., pero en la web tiene más opciones, dice. “Cambio con frecuencia”, cuenta.

Algunos minoristas multinacionales se han retirado de China o reconsideran sus objetivos en el país.

Wal-Mart Stores Inc., que ingresó a ese mercado en 1996, ya no apunta a ser el mayor minorista de China y dice que necesita trabajar en su propia estrategia en línea. En los últimos tres años, el tráfico en sus locales en el país ha disminuido gradualmente.

Imitando las estrategias de sus rivales chinos, Wal-Mart intenta enlazar su división en línea, Yihaodian, con sus locales a través de una aplicación que permite a los consumidores hacer pedidos en sus teléfonos para entregas a domicilio o recoger los productos en la tienda.

“Todos tienen problemas para encontrar el mejor modelo de negocios en este momento”, dice Matthew Crabbe, director de investigación de Asia-Pacífico de la consultora Mintel Group Ltd.

Las ventas de bienes de consumo de las principales 100 cadenas minoristas representaron 8% del total en 2014, frente a 11% en 2009, según la firma de servicios de bienes raíces comerciales de DTZ.

En el caso de Unilever, que genera cerca de 60% de sus ingresos en los mercados emergentes, el declive en China contribuyó a una caída de 2,7% en su facturación global el año pasado. La empresa cuenta con una de las mayores redes de distribución minorista en el país. Una vocera atribuyó el descenso en China a una débil demanda de los consu-

midores y dijo que la empresa no ha sido lenta en adaptarse a Internet. Las ventas en línea en China se han más que duplicado cada año desde 2012, agregó.

El lunes, la empresa anunció la apertura de una tienda virtual en la plataforma JD.com para vender marcas que incluyen su línea de champús Lux y que se ofrecerán por primera vez en China. Unilever ya tiene otro tipo de tiendas en la plataforma. La compañía prevé que sus ventas en general aumenten este año en China.

Unilever abrió su primera tienda en línea en un sitio de Alibaba en 2009, pero consultores afirman que fue más lenta que su rival Procter & Gamble en colocar todos sus productos en sitios de comercio electrónico de China. Eso hizo que sus artículos fueran más difíciles de hallar y afectó sus rankings de búsquedas en Alibaba, en los cuales las cifras de ventas tienen una gran influencia.

Construyendo seguridad e integración en Asia-Pacífico

La integración del Asia-Pacífico creció sustancialmente desde los noventa y China se ha convertido en el principal socio comercial de la mayor parte de los países de la región y se incrementaron la competencia y la cooperación entre EE.UU. y China.

[Building security and integration in the Asia Pacific](#)

By David Huang

East Asia Forum – 13/06/2015

The current strategic environment in the Asia Pacific can be characterised by an intensifying competition (mixed with some cooperation) between China and the US. As the strategic competition between these two countries is likely to intensify, whether they prefer to accommodate or confront each other will have spillover effects on other Asia Pacific countries' decisions.

The US has a hub-and-spoke alliance system with its allies such as Japan, Australia and South Korea. It also has close security ties to Singapore and Taiwan, and has solicited bilateral security cooperation with Vietnam, Indonesia and India. But these bilateral security arrangements are strained by two factors. China's continued power expansion and common problems across national borders demand multilateral solutions.

Economic interdependence within the Asia Pacific has increased substantially since the 1990s. Intra-regional trade and investment has more than doubled in terms of absolute volume, and now accounts for more than 50 per cent of all trade by Asia Pacific countries. China has become the largest trading partner for most of countries in the region. In the 1990s, Asian countries began pursuing bilateral FTAs. By 2010, they had signed more FTAs than anywhere else in the world.

Unlike Europe, economic interdependence in the Asia Pacific is generally managed by bilateral FTAs or sub-regional cross-border arrangements. While ASEAN and APEC provide valuable forums for regional economic dialogue and cooperation, they themselves do not produce tangible trade liberalisation. The ASEAN Way – building consensus without enforceable rules – has arguably slowed trade liberalisation and has also brought about the ‘spaghetti bowls’ problem: too many FTAs undermine the efficiency of existing trade arrangements.

The proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) aims to fix this problem by transforming bilateral agreements into a compatible multilateral arrangement. It seeks to accommodate country demands by allowing exceptional treatments or different phasing out periods. If it succeeds, RCEP at least represents a multilateral contractual-based trade agreement in the region, albeit based on the lowest common denominator.

Its competitor, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – now led by the United States – is pursuing a legally binding FTA. But with 12 members participating in the TPP negotiations, some commentators believe that reaching the terms of the TPP will be difficult. And the benefits cannot be fully realised as China, Taiwan, and South Korea are not included.

While the leaders of APEC consistently emphasise that RCEP and the TPP are compatible, many commentators believe they are not compatible at all for security and economic reasons. RCEP and the TPP pursue different trade objectives. RCEP emphasises economic development and the TPP emphasises market liberalisation and elimination of trade barriers. The TPP is standardised, while RCEP allows flexibility. Although China initially thought the TPP was a US plan to contain China economically, it has since tamed its criticism.

But RCEP and the TPP are still incompatible on regional security grounds. US security planners hope that expanding trade and investment within and among US allies will lead to them being less reliant on China’s market for economic growth. This would make them less prone to China’s threat of economic retaliation. It would be easier for the US to manage the cohesion of its Asia Pacific allies if they are trading within the TPP bloc.

But the US should not underestimate the resistance from domestic protectionists. Despite being portrayed as a high standard FTA, the TPP is likely to be regarded by Asian partners as a scheme to surrender the country’s economic autonomy to multinational corporations. A hard push for the TPP may lead to a rise of economic nationalism in Asia Pacific countries, which

easily turns into territorial nationalism. A case in point is the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute between Japan and China. Economic insecurity due to massive income inequality among Chinese citizens drove a nationalist movement against the Japanese.

On the other hand, RCEP allows flexibility and emphasises capacity building and development. It has become China's strategy to counterbalance the US-led TPP manoeuvre. Essential to RCEP's success is its efforts at making different rules of existing FTAs compatible, as well as codifying the existing practices of rules and norms.

If RCEP participants can strike a deal before those of TPP members, then a China-led economic order in the Asia Pacific can be sustained. China does not want to be forced to accept TPP rules when it is not yet ready to do so and probably prefers to liberalise its economy by its own rules. To that extent, China probably will concede some economic interests to other RCEP members in order to maintain coherence of the RCEP group.

Ordinary citizens in the Asia Pacific are facing a dilemma. Choosing the US will provide a security guarantee during territorial disputes, but the US's uncompromising version of trade liberalisation can hurt their livelihood. And China's flexible trade liberalisation is more attractive to average citizens, but its assertiveness over territorial disputes in South and East China seas makes its neighbours insecure. Choosing to participate in a trading bloc will have security implications in alliance politics. But no one can afford to choose neither trade bloc.

A solution could be an institutionalised bipolar system in the Asia Pacific, whereby each of the two regional hegemonies operate in an alliance bound by rules and institutions, much like NATO and the European Union in post WWII Europe. This would make policy signals easier to manage should accidental conflicts occur.

While one may contend that high economic interdependence could be enough to prevent accidental conflicts, it is no panacea for regional instability; high economic interdependence did not prevent World War I and II. To ensure that the institutionalised bipolar system is more stable, no country should be left out. If the system allows one country (such as Taiwan) to be isolated from trade and security blocs, the country may behave in an unpredictable way that could undermine the stability of the system.

China da el yuan a Broadway

La producción de varios musicales exitosos de Broadway tiene inversiones chinas. Comentaristas evalúan que los chinos consideran que esos musicales se presentarán en su

país y tendrán éxito, porque los musicales de EE.UU. tienen una creciente popularidad. También se estima que los chinos desarrollarán sus propios contenidos en el género.

[China gives its yuan to Broadway](#)

By Amy He

China Daily USA – New York – 08/06/2015

Winners from Sunday's Tony Awards have something else in common: Chinese backing.

China, with its growing appetite for Western musical theater productions, is beginning to put its money on Broadway. Titles nominated for the Tony Awards at Radio City Music Hall in New York - Hand to God, Something Rotten! and An American In Paris - all have investment from Chinese companies, according to The Wall Street Journal.

An American in Paris was nominated for 12 Tonys, including Best Musical. The musical, starring Robert Fairchild and Leanne Cope, is based on the 1951 movie of the same name starring Gene Kelly.

As of 10 pm ET Sunday, An American in Paris had won four Tonys: for Best Choreography (Christopher Wheeldon), Best Lighting Design of a Play (Natasha Katz), Best Orchestrations (Christopher Austin, Don Sebesky and Bill Elliott) and Best Scenic Design of a Musical (Bob Crowley and 59 Productions).

Christian Borle of Something Rotten! won Best Featured Actor in a Musical.

The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time won the Tony for Best Play.

Simone Genatt, chairman of Broadway Asia, one of the producers for An American in Paris and a production and distribution company that works primarily in Asia, said that the Chinese are investing in Broadway shows for touring opportunities and to try to learn about the live entertainment business.

"I think they're investing because they believe that these shows will come to China both for touring and licensing opportunities, and also because they are gathering knowledge and information to help expand the business for live entertainment in China, based on the commercial systems that are part of Broadway," she told China Daily.

Broadway Asia is producing the North American tour of An American in Paris and is looking to take the show to China by summer of 2018, Genatt said. China Broadway Entertainment is one of the backers of the Gene Kelly classic, according to The Wall Street Journal.

Genatt said that there has been “a huge arc in growth” in China, both in the expansion of the number of shows performed in the market and the number of cities that are playing the shows, and that’s why Chinese companies are looking to be involved in Broadway musical entertainment.

She predicts that *An American in Paris* will be “hugely successful” in the Chinese mainland.

“We think there are a lot of reasons why we chose this particular show with investment opportunity with Chinese partners; also because it’s all about Paris, and the Chinese love the French,” she said. “It has extraordinary and beautiful dance and music, and it’s a giant romantic story, so I think that from every point of view, it will touch the Chinese’s hearts. I think it will be very popular in the marketplace.”

Shanghai-based China Media Capital invested in two other Tony-award winners, *Hand to God* and *Something Rotten!*, both of which were produced by Broadway Global Ventures. Kevin McCollum, owner of the production company, declined to disclose to *The Wall Street Journal* how much the Chinese private-equity fund invested, but said that the backing can help the company expand into China.

McCollum said that he eventually hopes to create original shows with writers from both countries that can be a “fusion of both cultures,” allowing the shows to be performed both in the US and China, which is part of China Media Capital’s goals.

“Because at the end of the day, we want to make our own original shows,” Clark Xu, managing director of China Media Capital, told the *Journal*.

Western musical theater has seen popularity grow in China, with Broadway classics such as *Cats* and *The Sound of Music* touring in the country for years. Hits *Mamma Mia* and *Cats* have been translated to Chinese.

¿Qué sabemos del AIIB?

Presentación con la información básica del Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, actualizada al 1º de abril de 2015, publicada por *China Daily* el 9 de junio de 2015.

Se adjunta el link dado que por su formato no puede incorporarse al de este boletín.

[¿What do we know about AIIB?](#)

http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-04/01/content_19971274.htm

El segundo hijo, “más fácil de decir que de hacer”

Dangdai 16/06/2015

Un artículo de China.org.cn analiza las situaciones sociales y familiares que están suscitándose en China a partir de la reciente decisión del Gobierno de permitir a las familias tener dos hijos si uno de los padres es hijo único.

Muchos padres dicen que no tienen los recursos financieros para hacer crecer sus familias.

Para la mayoría de las familias en China, un importante cambio a la política de planeación familiar nacional está alterando dramáticamente sus vidas.

La reciente decisión del gobierno central tomada en la Tercera Sesión Plenaria del decimotavo Comité Central del Partido Comunista Chino (PCCh) permitirá a las familias tener dos hijos si uno de los padres es hijo único. Antes de la enmienda, las parejas sólo podían tener dos hijos si ambos padres eran los únicos de sus familias.

Cheng Wei, una mujer de 29 años de Hangzhou, provincia de Zhejiang, se encontraba en un viaje de negocios a Beijing cuando llegó la noticia de la decisión del gobierno el mes pasado.

Cheng, una contadora de una compañía privada en Hangzhou desde hace tres años, dijo que ella rara vez sigue las noticias políticas. Fue su esposo, Liu Jian quien la llamó tras el anuncio.

“¿Qué significa esto?”, preguntó por teléfono la madre, quien tiene una hija de 3 años.

“Significa que tenemos una elección que hacer” contestó su esposo.

Cheng es hija única y Liu tiene dos hermanos mayores. Tener dos hijos nunca fue una opción para la pareja.

“Nunca había pensado seriamente acerca de esto, porque parecía tan difícil en el pasado, aunque sí quiero tener dos hijos” dijo Cheng.

Pronto se mantuvo un debate familiar en casa de Cheng, durante el cual “todos los miembros de la familia se emocionaron por tener un recién nacido” señaló.

El segundo hijo, “más fácil de decir que de hacer”

Palabras clave: El segundo hijo, “más fácil de decir que de hacer”

“Mis padres están muy dispuestos a ayudar a criar a los niños, porque aún tienen buena salud” dijo Cheng. “Y han ayudado a criar a mi hija, así que tienen experiencia”.

Cheng es una de muchas familias que está considerando tener un segundo hijo. La Comisión de Salud Nacional y Planeación Familiar ha predicho que la enmienda resultará en 1.5 a 2 millones de nacimientos.

Sin embargo, una encuesta del 19 de diciembre de la Academia de Beijing de Ciencias Sociales muestra que en Beijing, alrededor del 51.5% de las familias prefiere tener un solo hijo, mientras que 38.3% de los encuestados quiere tener dos.

¿Cuál es la mayor razón para no tener un segundo hijo? En un país donde hay una gran brecha entre los ricos y pobres, no es de sorprenderse que el dinero sea un gran factor.

“Tener un segundo hijo es más fácil de decir que de hacer” dice Xu Qiong, una madre de 31 años de Cantón, en la provincia de Cantón.

Como muchas familias que ahora están autorizadas para tener un segundo hijo, Xu dice que tanto sus padres como sus suegros apoyan los deseos de ella y su esposo de tener un segundo hijo. Xi y su esposo se casaron poco después de concluir la universidad, y en 2005 nació su primogénito. Pronto Xu se convirtió en ama de hogar. La familia está viviendo en un departamento de dos cuartos en una universidad en Cantón, donde su esposo trabaja como catedrático.

Conforme el niño ha ido creciendo, el departamento se ha vuelto un poco apretado para Xu.

“No puedo ni imaginarme tener un bebé y a los cuatro viviendo aquí” dijo Xu riéndose. “Definitivamente necesitamos mudarnos a una casa grande si nuestra familia crece”.

En noviembre, los precios promedios de las viviendas en Cantón eran de 11.468 yuanes (\$1.889 dólares) por metro cuadrado, de acuerdo a la autoridad provincial de Cantón. Xu dijo que no pueden costear los precios actuales de las casas, en especial porque ella no se encuentra trabajando y su esposo gana menos de 10.000 yuanes al mes.

Xu dijo que otra razón de su indecisión es encontrar a alguien que cuide del bebé.

“Aunque no estoy trabajando, es definitivamente duro para mí cuidar a dos niños al mismo tiempo. Necesito ayuda de nuestros padres. Sin embargo, esa no es una buena idea”.

Poco después del nacimiento de su hijo en 2005, los padres de Xu llegaron a vivir con el matrimonio en Cantón y se quedaron con la familia por dos años.

“No había vivido con mis padres durante mucho tiempo, y mientras que estuvo aquí, mi padre y yo peleamos mucho por las cosas más pequeñas” recordó Xu.

Nacida en los años 80, Xu es hija única. Dice que tiene un mal carácter, que era incluso peor cuando su hijo tenía menos de dos años de edad.

“En realidad tengo muchos remordimientos de cuando estaba criando a mi hijo cuando éste era muy pequeño. Me agitaba fácilmente, no podía controlar mi carácter y me portaba mal con él cuando estaba muy estresada” recordaba Xu.

Xu dijo que probablemente actuaba de esa manera, porque es hija única y jamás había cuidado a alguien.

“Mi hijo es como un espejo para mí” dice. “Al cuidar de él, gradualmente aprendí a ajustar mi mal temperamento y cuidar de él con gran paciencia. Y ésta es también una razón por la cual quiero un segundo hijo. Seré una mejor madre si lo hago por segunda vez. He aprendido y mejorado mucho de mí misma mientras mi hijo crecía”.

Xu dijo que ella nunca se sintió sola cuando era niña, porque fue criada en una familia grande con muchos primos y parientes. Su hijo, sin embargo, está solo y ha pedido hermanitos y hermanitas desde que tenía 4 años.

“La gente de Cantón piensa que tener más hijos significa más bendiciones” dijo Xu.

Yu Jian, de 28 años y originario de Hefei, provincia de Anhui, dijo que no es una buena idea que un niño no tenga hermanos. Tanto Yu como su hermana menor nacieron en los

80, cuando la política de planeación familiar estaba siendo aplicada estrictamente. El padre de Yu renunció a su trabajo en una empresa de propiedad estatal tras el nacimiento de la hermana de Yu.

“Pero, yo tuve una infancia feliz” dice Yu, quien asegura que él y su hermana confían el uno en el otro. En 2006, tras sufrir un accidente automovilístico, su hermana desarrolló un mal carácter y se enojaba fácilmente con todos y con todo.

Yu era la única persona con la que ella podía hablar en aquél entonces.

“No puedo tener dos hijos ahora, porque tanto mi esposa como yo no somos hijos únicos” explica. “Pero, si algún día la política nos permite tener otro hijo, definitivamente lo tendremos. Simplemente es mejor para un niño tener una hermana o hermano”.

Editores: Julio Sevares y María Belén Balardini