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Linguistic Kinship vs. Linguistic Fragmentation: Iberian America, Europe, and Long-Term Interstate Security-Governance*

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Introduction

It is obvious that "regions" are simply one possible strategy for the grouping of countries. There are alternative strategies. When scholars refer to the Global North or the Global South, they are grouping countries in a way that goes over and beyond geographical regions. The same holds true for the Third World, a huge residual non-geographic category that may be the worst-conceived of groupings.

States can also be grouped in ad hoc categories based on perceived affinities. When in 1977 I was a graduate student at St. Antony's College, Oxford, my supervisor, the then Oxford Professor of Latin American History, D.C.M. (Christopher) Platt, objected to the concept of Latin American Studies and understood that an ad hoc category that cut across geographical regions had to be created, defined in terms of what he and others called "countries of recent settlement." It included Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina and Uruguay. He understood that, until 1950, the developmental patterns of these countries were very similar. Christopher Platt dedicated much of his academic life to the study of "countries of recent settlement," and back in 1989 I had the honor of being the author of a chapter in one of his edited volumes, just before he died (Escudé, 1989: 60-70).

Platt lost his epistemological battle. His Oxford disciple, Laurence Whitehead, continues to refer to "countries of recent settlement," but he limits his use of the category to Anglophone states. Latin American Studies are here to stay, and so is the case for Latin America as a region.

On the other hand, several authors participating in this dossier have stated repeatedly that all international regions are social constructs, and this is obviously true. But paradoxically, and despite the fact that it has been contested in the past by Platt and other scholars, Latin America is perhaps the least constructed of regions because its name carries an adjective, "Latin," that reminds us of its linguistic commonality. Indeed, as a socially-constructed region, Latin America is unique.

It is probably due to this linguistic kinship that Latin America in general, and Iberian America in particular, has such a remarkable record in terms of the relative scarcity of interstate conflict, a subject that has been pioneered by Kacowicz (1998,

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2005, 2015) (1). It suffices to remember that in their entire history as separate, independent states, never have archrivals Colombia and Venezuela gone to war. The same score holds for Argentina and Chile: in two-hundred years of independent history there have been no wars between them. And in the case of Argentina and Brazil, there was only one low-intensity conflagration between 1825 and 1828, decades before the German state came into being in 1871.

From that year onwards, immediate neighbors Germany, Britain and France waged among themselves the cruelest wars in the history of mankind, while no wars at all were waged after 1828 between Argentina and Brazil. Wars in South America have been comparatively infrequent and have destroyed far less property and lives than in Europe, Asia or Africa. It does not seem inconsequential that according to local political rhetoric, folklore and school textbooks, Latin American states are "sister nations."

Indeed, as Kacowicz said when discussing the draft of this paper, it could be argued that a sort of "linguistic peace" prevails among these siblings. Unlike other regions of the world, in South America military prowess seems more a source of national self-esteem than a means to be used forcibly against other states. As I posited in 2010, armies tend to be one of the instruments through which the weak identities of its states are reinforced.

This peculiarity of Latin America comes out clearly in the statistics generated by Small and Singer (1982). During the approximately two-hundred years of Iberian American independence, the European and North American states have had four times as many enlisted men and killed dozens of millions more than the Iberian American states. Although in intra-regional terms North America has been more peaceful, it exports violence massively.

And domestically, South America has never witnessed conflicts comparable to the Spanish Civil War, the ethnic cleansings of the former Yugoslavia, Pol Pot's slaughters in Cambodia, or the massacres perpetrated in Rwanda by Hutus and Tutsis, not to mention the Jewish Holocaust led by Hitler in Eu-

rope. Without the slightest apologetic intention, it must be noted that the doings of such loathsome dictators as Videla and Pinochet are next to nothing in comparison to the accomplishments of their peers in Europe, Asia and Africa in the 20th Century (Escudé, 2010).

With the benefit of hindsight, it is very clear that owning property in Buenos Aires or Sao Paulo in 1910 was far less risky than owning it in London or Berlin. The Europeans seem dedicated to destroying nearly all their property twice per century, and measuring country-risk indices beginning on the day after the last destruction, as if there were no previous history. Because of the soft power generated by their quick recovery of hard power, they manage to convince the world that Europe is a very safe place for investments, while South America hardly ever makes it to investment grade.

World regions vis-à-vis residual categories

Indeed, fable has it that South America is part of a so-called "conflict-ridden periphery," which is composed of a set of numerous states that some theoreticians counterpoise to the "industrialized global North." It is often claimed that the global North is a "zone of peace" whilst the Third World is a "zone of conflict" (Ayoob 1998: 33-34).

Clearly, South America is not a part of this "Third World." If one's scholarly horizons are limited to this sort of thinking, South America appears to be quite out-of-this-world, for it is neither a part of the "global North" nor of the "global South." (2) While acknowledging significant differences between its individual states and sub-regions, it will be seen below that largely as a consequence of the historical processes whereby its identities and "nationalities" have been constructed, Iberian America is unique and incomparable to any other world region.

Iberian America, a world-unto-itself

Indeed, is a world in which the same language is spoken all the way through the 10,713 km that separate Lisbon from Shanghai even imaginable?

Well, it so happens that Castilian Spanish is spoken through the 10,759 km that separate Tijuana, in northernmost México, from Ushuaia, in southernmost Argentina. And this distance is considerably longer than the 7,827 kilometers that separate worlds as different as Washington DC and Moscow.

Moreover, the other Iberian language of the region is Portuguese, which has close affinities with Castilian Spanish, and is easier to understand than Catalan for a Mexican, an Argentine or a Spaniard from Madrid. Indeed, the comparison between the 505 km that separate two Spanish cities with distinctively different Latin tongues such as Madrid and Barcelona, vis-à-vis the 10,055 kilometers that separate Ciudad Juarez, in the U.S.-Mexican border, from Punta Arenas, in the Strait of Magellan, is enough to make the point that Iberian American integration is far more solid than anything imaginable in the "Old World." We would inhabit an entirely different (and infinitely safer) planet if the same language were spoken from Portugal to China.

The historical roots of Iberian America's linguistic integration and Europe's linguistic segmentation

It is my hypothesis that Iberian America's linguistic integration and European linguistic segmentation are at the root of the long-term differences in these regions' security-governance, linguistic integration being more conducive to peace than linguistic segmentation.

Moreover, it is clear that in a context of linguistic segmentation, language will be an essential dimension of the "national" identity; whilst in a region of linguistic integration the "national" identity will be defined by other elements and will probably be weaker, hypothetically leading to less bellicose mindsets.

Thus, if we are to understand the origins of the differences in long-term security governance between Iberian American and European states, we must delve into the processes of state-building and identity-formation in both regions.

Following Anderson (1983), in Europe a two-stage process took place:

1) With the fall of Rome, a gradual but increasing language fragmentation unfolded, due to the decrease in trade and communications in the feudal order that followed. Because violence and anarchy made communications between provinces diminish, language evolved differently in not-so-distant realms that had previously shared the same imperial tongue.

2) However, with the advent of the printing press, a reverse process of partial amalgamation through new lines of linguistic kinship was unleashed, which was to some extent haphazard because print languages emerged only in the cities in which important printing presses were established by bold capitalists.

In other words, originally, in Latin Europe the collapse of empire generated language-segmentation. But in Latin America, the collapse of empire did not produce language-segmentation, for the obvious reason that the printing press had long since been invented and was active throughout the region's capital cities, producing books, magazines and newspapers that stabilized language (Escudé 2010).

Moreover, when Rome fell, the linguistic Latinization of vast portions of Europe was far more advanced than was the linguistic Latinization of Iberian America when Napoleon created the preconditions for its independence. But such was the power of the printing press that, in Iberian America, Latinization continued forcefully after the fall of empire, quite the contrary of what happened in Europe a millennium-and-a-half before. And contrariwise to what occurred in Roman provinces that were not fully Romanized, such as Germania and Britannia, in Iberian America the fall of empire did not lead to a return of indigenous tongues.

Indeed, with few partial exceptions like Bolivia, the states born in the early 19th Century continued with the linguistic and religious tasks that had been begun by their metropolis in the 16th Century. The local elites that struggled for independence were thoroughly Hispanicized and Lusitanized. They resided in cities spanning from California to Buenos Aires, which were like "islands surrounded by an indigenous ocean" (Halperin Donghi, 1969). That heterogeneous ocean was not in any way Latinized, and its diverse peoples would remain the absolute-others to the Lat-

inized urban dwellers until the Conquest was thoroughly consummated. But contrariwise to the Latinized city dwellers, the diverse indigenous peoples shared little among themselves, making it easy for the expansion of Latinization, which was aided by the heavy munition of the printing press. Thus, the final stage of the Conquest was not achieved by the original Conquistadors, but by the new independent states.

While the task remained incomplete, the commonality among the Hispanicized urban islands was paramount, to the point that a person from Bogotá was a stranger but not a foreigner in Lima. In Spanish-America, founding fathers were interchangeable. Caracas-born Andrés Bello was the originator of the first stable Chilean foreign policy, and today the institute that educates Chile's diplomats bears the name of the illustrious Venezuelan. Manuel Blanco Encalada, the first in history to bear the official title of "President of the Republic of Chile," was born in Buenos Aires; Cornelio Saavedra, the president of the first autonomous government of Buenos Aires (*Primera Junta*), was born in present-day Bolivia; Ignacio Álvarez Thomas, born in Arequipa, Peru, headed the executive power in Buenos Aires as interim supreme director (1815-16). And during their exiles, Argentine presidents-to-be Domingo Faustino Sarmiento and Bartolomé Mitre were public officials in Chile and Bolivia (Cisneros and Escudé, 1998-2003: Vol. 1).

These cases are not very different from those of the Iberians Trajan, Hadrian and Theodosius I as emperors of Rome, or even before them, of the Iberian Seneca, the empire's virtual dictator during Nero's childhood. In many senses, the Roman Empire was to Latin Europe what the Iberian empires were to Latin America. The most important difference, which is related to Wallerstein's (1974) concept of world-time, lies in the absence, when Rome fell, of a technological artifice like the printing press, which prevented the segmentation of language in Iberian America. In terms of what its societies share with one another, Latin America appears to be what Latin Europe would have been if the printing press had been available when the Roman Empire fell (Escudé

2010).

Contrariwise, without the printing press Latin America would not have become Latin America. It would not have been Latin.

Europe and Iberian America: *vive la différence!*

These processes are of the utmost importance if we are to understand Iberian America. The relative weakness of a national consciousness within its individual societies is causally associated to the relative strength of pan-Iberian American commonalities (which are even stronger, of course, if we limit our analysis to Spanish America).

Vice-versa, the relative strength of a national consciousness within each European state is causally associated to the relative weakness of the common links uniting European societies. And the origin of this difference lies, partly at least, in European language segmentation vis-à-vis Iberian American linguistic kinship and Spanish American linguistic unity.

Indeed, the hard facts regarding the linguistic integration of Iberian America reflect the actuality of an unparalleled commonality for such an extended, contiguous region. Originally it reached far beyond language, to include religion, social structure, literature, architecture and way of life. Moreover, commonality between Spanish and Portuguese America was strengthened during the decades in which both empires were dynastically united under the rule of Kings Philip II, Philip III and Philip IV of Spain (1580-1640), a time in which people and cultural influences circulated freely between the two realms.

In the face of the economic and political centrifugal forces that made it impossible for Spanish America to remain united once the imperial grip was destroyed by Bonaparte, this commonality made nation-building more difficult for the incipient states, because their Hispanicized inhabitants were hardly different from state to state.

Indeed, although other cleavages were very much in force within each domestic society, among Iberian American states the "other" was not quite the other, and hence the self was not quite the self. For this reason, taxation and the levy of men lacked the

legitimacy they often acquire when a strong sense of identity associated to the state is at play. Therefore, in the absence of language as a source of differentiation, other elements were emphasized by the new states in order to consolidate a perception of otherness without which, as Barth (1969) has noted, there can be no real consciousness of self.

Summarizing, in Spanish and Portuguese America language was not segmented and did not become a source of differentiation because the printing press was already in place when the Iberian empires collapsed. Both the interchangeability of Spanish America's founding fathers (from approximately 1810 to 1860), and the region's unique linguistic contiguity, bear witness to the significance of Benedict Anderson's oft-resisted hypothesis about the relevance of print capitalism in the generation of linguistic proto-nationalities and associated phenomena.

Myths associated to Iberian American identities

Notwithstanding the commonalities, diverging economic and political interests led to the political fragmentation of this huge territory, and to the formation of separate state units. As R.N. Burr (1965) suggested, at the time of Independence the Iberian American order was ripe for the emergence of a chain of commands similar to that of pre-Westphalian Europe. But Wallersteinian world-time conditioned local elites to think in post-Westphalian terms of sovereign entities fully separated from each other. They could not bear themselves to think that Spanish America was a world unto itself and did not need to be ordered in the same way as the European kingdoms.

Indeed, elites felt that "nation-states" had to be built even in the absence of the sharp linguistic and cultural differentiation that made such entities less artificial in the European context. Nation-building required the construction of a new identity specific to each incipient state. It was not aided by preexisting ethnic or cultural differences of significance, such as race, religion or language. It was a top-down process analogous to phenomena such as

Russification. Local elites whose political and economic interests made it advisable to break up the huge empire, used the nascent educational systems, the military, and other means, to construct artificial differences between a virtuous "we" and a vicious "other" that usually spoke "our" language but was nonetheless intrinsically alien.

The extent of commonality made it imperative to construct a malevolent "other," and this was partly achieved through the idea that one's country had lost territories to ambitious and immoral neighbors whose mission in history seemed to be to deprive one's country of its rightful inheritance. The resulting myths of territorial losses common to Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Perú, Uruguay and Venezuela, are extremely interesting.

Argentine, Chilean, Paraguayan and Peruvian school textbooks, for example, attribute to their respective Colonial and post Colonial jurisdictions vast territories that overlap each other almost completely. Many Peruvian and Paraguayan textbooks attribute all of Tierra del Fuego and Patagonia (both coasts included) to the "original" territory that their respective states "should" have inherited. If we consider that the Chilean textbooks regret the "loss" of what is now Argentine Patagonia and the Argentine half of Tierra del Fuego, and that the Argentine texts regret the "loss" of the Chilean half of Tierra del Fuego (and oftentimes, of all of southern Chile up to the Bío-Bío river), we find that there are four countries whose school textbooks regret the loss of a part or all of these austral territories.

Indeed, some Paraguayan textbooks speak of the "ten dismemberments" their territory was subject to through its history. They claim that, in Colonial times, Paraguay was bathed by an ocean that was called the Sea of Paraguay at least as often as it was called Atlantic, and that the jurisdiction itself was known in Spain as the "Giant Province of the Indies" (*Provincia Gigante de Indias*). Similarly, in Bolivia there are official secondary school textbooks with titles like *The Bolivian Sea (El Mar Boliviano)*, which are of obligatory study for high school students.

Finally, the school maps depicting the "Old Presidency of Quito" (*Antigua Presidencia de Quito*)

convey an image of an Ecuador that in Colonial times reached the Atlantic Ocean. If all of the territories that the Spanish-speaking countries of South America allegedly lost were added up, we would obtain a sum total equal to at least twice the size of the entire Continent (3).

The political consequences of these perceptions project themselves to the present day. Argentina's 1982 war over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands was essentially a conflict in which an identity-related issue was brought to the forefront of affairs by a military government anxious to recover popular support. Similarly, territorial disputes make the relations between Peru, Bolivia and Chile chronically difficult, having led to the ousting of a recent Bolivian president, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, who was dedicated to better commercial relations with Chile. Pragmatism is deemed unpatriotic when it implies concessions in identity-related issues (4).

But the phenomenon is not limited to these myths. In some Spanish American societies, the construction of imaginary losses led to the construction of imaginary sovereignties. Latin American magic realism, a literary style, seems to emerge not only from esthetic explorations but also from the deeper roots of local culture. Alejo Carpentier, one of its pioneers, stated eloquently that his "most important problem was destroying the line of demarcation that separates what seems real from what seems fantastic." (5) This feat seems to have been accomplished not only by literary genií like Carpentier or Gabriel García Márquez, but also by some foreign ministries.

Indeed, until the signature of the Brasilia Agreement between Ecuador and Peru in 1998, Ecuador included the Peruvian city of Iquitos as its own on its maps, by force of law. And Argentina and Chile continue to indoctrinate their school children with images of their countries which include an imaginary austral empire that they will never own. Both states include their Antarctic claims, which overlap with each other's and with Britain's, in the maps their children study and in the figures they are made to memorize regarding their respective areas.

To this, Argentina adds the Falkland/

Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. Its textbooks and road signs often claim that its southern city of Ushuaia is approximately the middle point between its northernmost extreme bordering Bolivia and its southernmost border in the South Pole. Chile does likewise with its city of Punta Arenas.

In this respect, both countries encourage their populations to inhabit a world of fiction. While international sources attribute to Argentina a surface of 2.792.810 Km², Argentine textbooks, as well as the website of the Presidency of the Argentine Nation say that it has a surface of 3.761.274 Km². In the words of the presidential website, this territory lies "in the American continent, the Antarctic continent and the austral islands". (6)

Likewise, while international sources attribute to Chile 755.838 Km², Chilean textbooks say that the country possesses 2.006.096 Km², "without consideration of its territorial sea, its Exclusive Economic Zone and the corresponding continental shelf". Texts go on to describe Chile as a "tricontinental" country, because it occupies territory in South America, Oceania (due to Easter Island) and Antarctica. "*Chile es un país tricontinental*" is a slogan with which its children are indoctrinated.

This territorial identity is usually but not always reinforced with high military spending. This was the case for Argentina before the demise of its last dictatorship, and continues to be the case for Chile. According to the latter's Constitution, ten per cent of the earnings of the national copper company CODELCO must be used for the purchase of military equipment. In addition to this, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2006 Chile invested 4.9 billion dollars in its armed forces. Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela spend similarly disproportionate amounts of money on their military establishments, thus taking away scarce resources from socio-economic development. Notwithstanding, as said in an earlier section, these monies are not used for war. They fulfill another, more enigmatic anthropological function.

European integration as immunization against intra

-European war

In Latin America, the absence of massive interstate war has made regional integration less urgent. Contrariwise, in Europe, the depravities of the great wars generated a powerful motivation for integration. It was so powerful a motivation that, as government doctrine, it first emerged in the United States in the aftermath of World War II. Indeed, not only the economic integration but also the "political unification of Europe" became an official goal of U.S. policy, publicly endorsed by John Foster Dulles, George Marshall and Dean Acheson. Unification, which was sought by the Americans before it was considered officially by the Europeans, was intended to eliminate the possibility that a third world war be unleashed as a consequence of European rivalries (Hogan 1982, Wexler 1983).

Europeans took on the challenge, despite the formidable cultural barriers emerging from their strong sense of national identity. The project was consolidated because of its economic successes, and also because it served other political interests: in some cases, it became a way of bypassing conflicts between subnational and national identities; in others, it enhanced national self-esteem, nesting it in the grander European context (Fusi 2000, Llovera 2005, Diez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001, Diez Medrano 2003, Jáuregui and Ruiz Moreno 2005, Kokosalakis and Psimneos, 2005).

Soon enough, the European Communities became the model for Latin American integration projects. During decades, Europe, a region with less commonalities and a very old history of intra-regional hatreds and massive violence, was apparently far more successful in achieving integration than Iberian America, a region that was comparatively much more peaceful, and whose countries shared many more cultural elements with each other than did the European ones. Needless to say, when comparing the two regions it was seldom asked if "long-term peace" is not really the best definition of "integration." Integration was usually defined in the terms best suited for the consolidation of European soft power and prestige.

Moreover, the European integration process was dealt a strong blow when, in 2005, a French referendum rejected (and indeed vetoed) the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE). And an even stronger setback followed in 2016, when the British voted to altogether leave the European Union.

This denouement is not surprising if it is considered that it was long known that a European sense of identity had not superseded the old national identities. As has been shown by numerous empirical studies, the issue of support for the European Union is different from that of European national identity (Inglehart, Rabier and Reif 1991; Gabel 1998; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Diez Medrano 2003; Citrin and Sides 2004; Hermann, Brewer and Rise 2004; Hoehn and Lancefield 2005, and Fligstein 2008). Although support for the EU is high in most members, only 12.7% of European citizens firmly identify with Europe (Fligstein 2008: 125).

Empirical studies show that the people most likely to consider themselves Europeans are socio-economically more privileged than those who only identify themselves with individual states, probably because they have more opportunities to travel, speak second languages and interact with like-minded people from other European countries. Paradoxically, exactly the same happens in the Latin American countries that have historically received an important influx of immigrants from overseas: the more privileged and educated they are, the more likely they are to consider themselves... Europeans!

The failure of identity integration

If economic integration has meant little in the way of generating a European sense of identity, Latin American integration efforts have advanced even less in the production of an Iberian American identity. There may be a partial exception to this among left-of-center nationalists and populists who harbor an ideologically-based identification with the region. For such people, it may be politically-correct and even imperative to proclaim "we are Latin Americans." But this does not mean that their loyalties have been transferred from their states to their region. The point

was illustrated by the recent environment vs. paper-mills dispute between the ordinary citizens of the Argentine province of Entre Ríos, and the government and people of Uruguay, which soured bilateral relations for years.

Notwithstanding, the relative weakness of an Iberian American sense of identity comes out clearly when we compare the answers of Latin Americans and Spaniards to the question "how akin do you feel to the Latin American region?" According to the 2003 Latinobarometer, 58% of Argentines, 55% of Chileans, 54% of Mexicans and 42% of Brazilians said that they felt "very much" or "somewhat" akin to Latin America. The mean among Latin American states was 52%, with 23% answering that they feel "very much" and 28% that they feel "somewhat" akin to their own region. In order to compare, in 2004 Madrid's Real Instituto El Cano posed the same question to the Spanish population, finding that 61% of Spaniards say they feel "very much" (29%) and "somewhat" (32%) akin to Latin America (Nova 2004).

In other words, the Spaniards say that they feel more affinity with Latin America than do the Latin Americans themselves. This not only reveals a Spanish-Latin American commonality, but also the limited affinity that the citizens of the diverse Latin American countries feel towards the region as such. In order to gauge the odd comparison, it is interesting to note that, according to the same poll, when Spaniards confront the question "*From your perspective as a European, who do you sympathize with most, the United States or Latin America?*," as many as 83% answer "Latin America." (7)

Conclusions

Summarizing, it seems clear that, on the one hand, neither of the two regions has advanced much in the generation of a regional identity capable of competing with the national ones. On the other hand, it is also clear that their progress towards regional integration is conditioned by very different path dependences. Moreover, it is indisputable that, as a region, Iberian America has more commonali-

ties than Europe, a factor that hypothetically underlies the former's greater success in its long-term interstate security governance. Although both regions are social constructs, conceiving Europe as a region requires a greater constructivist effort than conceiving Iberian America as a region.

The Spanish American states were carved out of what was once a pan-Hispanic American proto-nationality. The one Luso American state, Brazil, also sprang from an Iberian empire. Even in the Brazilian case, the commonality of origin is remarkable. These countries shared so many things that, in order for the individual states to be viable, their commonality had to be destroyed.

Perhaps they did not wage war frequently among themselves not only because of ongoing commonalities but also because they lacked the domestic power to impose war on their own societies. And perhaps, as Tilly (1975) and Centeno (2002) suggest, they never developed strong domestic state capabilities precisely because they did not wage interstate war frequently enough. Notwithstanding, the fact is that Iberian America is much more successful than Europe in terms of its long-term balance of interstate war and peace.

Regardless of the other variables associated with these complex historical processes, it was thanks to the printing press that, after the collapse of empire, commonality could not be fully destroyed among the Latinized city dwellers of the huge, 10,000 km long region. Latinization spread and became fully dominant. As a consequence, domestically weak states with great linguistic affinities were born. In comparison to other world regions, these states were remarkably "civilized," if we are to define civility in terms of long-term interstate peace. And it may be that this combination of "civility" and lack of domestic and external power condemned the region to strategic irrelevance in comparison to other, more war-prone states.

So then, what do we mean by "national identity" when we attempt to compare Latin America and Europe? Furthermore, when we ask Latin Americans whether or not there is such a thing as a Latin American identity, do we mean the same thing as when we

ask a European if there is such a thing as an European identity? And would the question be understood by a European whose country has, in relatively recent times, fought the cruelest of wars against European neighbors whose languages are very different from their own, in the same way as it would be understood by Iberian Americans whose parents and grandparents have never witnessed such a war against "sister nations", and whose language is either the same or very similar to their own?

Although at first sight the queries are the same, to formulate them to Europeans and Iberian Americans is to ask very different questions, because the images that will be brought to European and Iberian American minds will be very different. Both may answer similarly, "there is no common European identity," or "there is no common Iberian American identity," yet these phrases mean very different things.

Neither the lack nor the existence of a common Iberian American identity is equivalent to the lack or existence of a common European identity. The perceived inexistence of a common Iberian American identity comes together with a set of Latin American commonalities that would be unthinkable even for Europeans who perceive the existence of a common European identity. The question, processed by an Iberian American, will take for granted these commonalities, yet s/he will often demand more, arguing that a common identity requires more than sharing all these things. A European cannot even imagine that such commonalities might exist among citizens of different nation-states, yet he or she may respond that there is indeed a common European identity, precisely because s/he realizes just how atrocious the consequences of intra-regional segmentation can be.

For these reasons, after 1945, European economic integration became an imperative if a third world war was to be prevented. This drew at least some Europeans together. Yet whatever commonality was generated as a result of the integration process did not suffice for the promulgation of a European constitution, which was rejected in 2005. National identity still prevails, and when we say

"national identity" we mean unique identities unlike anything found in Latin America that goes by the same denomination.

There is, however, a paradoxical confluence between the two regions. Like Iberian America long before it, the European Union has now become a zone of peace. The two regions' historical experiences, so different from one another, have led to a point of convergence: war among their states has become almost unthinkable.

Indeed, Europe appears to be going the civilized, Latin American way.

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References

- (1) I shall usually refer to "Iberian America" rather than "Latin America" for two reasons, the first being a matter of principle and the second of practicality. The first is that "Latin America" is a concept invented by the French as a part of a policy of cultural expansion, because "Latin" is also akin to France, which has traditionally been considered part of Latin Europe. The second is that by considering only the Spanish and Portuguese-speaking countries, we can legitimately exclude from our analysis several states that are distinctively different from the Iberian American states and that make generalizations more questionable.
- (2) Ayooob (1998: 45) explicitly presupposes that, in the Third World, interstate conflict and the possibility of conflict resolution emerge from issues of domestic order. He asserts that "the linkage between domestic and external variables also explains the nexus between intrastate and interstate conflicts, and the intertwining of the state-making enterprise with regional balance of power issues." Contrariwise, in Latin America, the regional balance of power has largely become a non-issue. It can be asserted that, from the point of view of peace and security, a large country such as Argentina has entered a post-national phase of its history (Escudé 2015).
- (3) These research data, limited to the Spanish-speaking countries of South America, were first presented in C. Escudé 1992, and later reproduced in 1998, in Volume 1 of A. Cisneros and C. Escudé, et al, *Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina*. Historical maps with boundaries similar to the ones described above can be found in numerous South American school textbooks throughout the XX Century. See, for example, Emiliano Gómez Ríos, *El Paraguay y su Historia*, 1963; Armando Paiva, *Geografía de la República del Paraguay*, 1976; Atilio Sivirichi, *Historia del Perú*, 1939; José Antonio del Busto Duthurburu, *Historia del Perú*, 1964; Gustavo Pons Muzzo, *Las Fronteras del Perú*, several editions; Luis Aníbal Mendoza García, *Derecho Territorial Ecuatoriano*, c. 1982; Pedro Cunhil Grau, *Geografía de Chile*, 1977; Alfredo Ayala Z., *Geografía Política de Bolivia*, 1941; Florean Sannabria G., *El Mar Boliviano*, 1988; Levi Marrero, *Venezuela y sus Recursos*, 1963; Mauricio Schurmann Pacheco, *Historia del Uruguay en los Siglos XIX y XX*, 1977, etc. Not always is there consistency in the way that the different texts of a given country depict the alleged historical boundaries of their formerly grand territories. Nevertheless, give or take some thousands of square kilometers, all of these countries convey myths of territorial losses through their textbooks. Despite the variations between textbooks, the alleged former boundaries of Peru, Paraguay, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay and Bolivia usually configure huge territories, much greater than in present times, while those of Venezuela depict more modest losses. Colombia presents a curious exception in terms of its myths of territorial losses, which are completely absent from its

school textbooks despite the very real loss of Panama, and despite its having been the center of Bolívar's short-lived *Gran Colombia* (which would be the typical historical basis for South American territorial loss mythologies). Finally, it should be noted that although generating an identity for Portuguese-speaking Brazil was much easier, and although probably as a consequence, myths of territorial losses do not occupy an important place in Brazilian culture, even the Brazilians mourn the loss of their "Provincia Cisplatina", i.e., present day Uruguay.

- (4) For the case of Argentina, I made a survey of the nationalist contents of geography textbooks from 1879 to 1986, and of the nationalist contents of pedagogic doctrines from 1900 to 1950. The results were published in C. Escudé 1987, 1988, 1990 and 1992.
- (5) Interview in *Primera Plana* magazine, Buenos Aires, 20-26 June 1967 (Year 5, N° 234), pp. 52-55.
- (6) The Spanish text reads: "*En el extremo Sur del continente americano se encuentra la República Argentina (...). Con una superficie de 3.761.274 Km², el territorio argentino posee un paisaje variado (...). Por su extensión -que corresponde al Continente Americano; al Continente Antártico (incluyendo las Islas Orcadas del Sur) y las islas australes (Georgias del Sur y Sandwich del Sur)- ocupa el cuarto lugar entre los países americanos (después de Canadá, Estados Unidos de América y la República Federativa del Brasil) y el séptimo a nivel mundial.*"
- (7) Ibid.

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