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CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY, TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY
INTERIM SECRETARIAT, LIMITED NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE FOR NORTHEAST ASIA**

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Keynote Address

International Seminar

Arms Race and Nuclear Developments in South Asia

By

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South Asia and the Second Nuclear Age

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It was with great pleasure and humility that I accepted the invitation to take part in this vital seminar that is featuring specialists from Pakistan, India, and other involved states. As many in this audience know, I have now spent some 45 years of my professional life involved in the study of Asian affairs – and almost that long participating in the debates, both inside and outside of government, regarding the employment and then the control of nuclear weapons.

It is also my great pleasure to return to Islamabad after more than twenty years. In 1982 as Associate Dean of the National War College in Washington, D.C., and as a Colonel in the Air Force, I led a two-week trip of a dozen senior military and government civilian students to Pakistan and India. On that occasion we had the opportunity to visit Karachi, Islamabad, Peshawar, Lahore, New Delhi, Mumbai, and Agra. It was only a glimpse into this remarkable region, but it signaled a very real moment in the development of all of us who took part.

It was during that trip that I met Dr. Imtiaz Bokhari, now Vice President of IPRI. May I recognize publicly our decades-long friendship developed as we jointly tried to understand the official policies of our respective governments. Also in the audience is Major General Nawaz Chaudry, also a dear friend, who as a Brigadier and Military Attaché participated in the very first class of international military officers to attend the U.S. National Defense University.

To all gathered here I reiterate the great honor I feel in having this opportunity to take part in this meeting. To all here from South Asia, especially Pakistan and India I want to thank you for individually accepting the challenge to work for peace in South Asia. For all my colleagues not from South Asia, I gratefully join you in sharing our experiences with our friends from the vast sub-continent.

During my brief time with you, I hope to share some of my personal experiences as a nuclear weapons targeting officer in the U.S. Air Force; comment about Paul Bracken's work on the 2nd Nuclear Age; describe briefly what we have been doing in Northeast Asia to create a new regional security infrastructure; and suggest some

ideas for organizing for this 2nd Nuclear Age. In this final respect, I hope to have general comments and some specific to the situation in South Asia.

Not that many years ago, it really seems almost like yesterday, my boss, an Air Force two star, came into our room in the underground of SAC Headquarters and looked around with some authority. All was ready. He turned to us and said, as best I can remember, “We have some time, why don’t you call your loved one and say goodbye. But don’t let on why you are calling!” My wife can still remember that call. Call it a woman’s intuition, but we both remember that day as clear as a bell.

I was an Air Force Captain working in the underground planning bunker of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, the group responsible for the Single Integrated Operations Plan for the U.S. military – the nuclear war plan, and it was October 1962. The world stood on the brink of the first nuclear exchange in history.

SAC was sealed; aircraft were on airborne alert; all “hanger queens” aircraft that were in for repairs but still flyable were brought to operational status; headquarters-based qualified flight crews were relieved of administrative duties and assigned targets; and the great military establishment with SIOP responsibilities be they Air Force or Navy stood as one giant bow, pulled back to the point of release -- the detent point in French – waiting for the command to fire.

Fortunately, the command did not come. The airborne alert was reduced and all eventually returned to normal – perhaps DEFCON Five. In the aftermath, we learned that President Kennedy was pleased with the response of his military, but that General Lemay was not. We also learned from later exchanges between senior Russian and American participants how well prepared Soviet forces on Cuba were. We indeed dodged a bullet, or to continue with the metaphor, an arrow that would have eliminated most of western civilization as we know it.

Paul Bracken, in his book *Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age*, notes that we have indeed entered the Second Nuclear Age.¹ The First lasted from 1947 to 1991. But it was the period 1947-1967 that was the most dangerous. Certainly, I would agree. He argues that deterrence did work during this early stage, but it was marked by some very close calls – Berlin, Panmunjom, Taiwan, Beirut and Cuba. Ultimately, after the Cuban Missile Crisis both sides realized the magnitude of an error and began the steady process toward

¹ Paul Bracken, *Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age* (New York, N.Y.: Harper Collins Publishers, 1999).

developing the restraining infrastructures that made the period from 1968 to 1991 so much more predictable.

Certainly, the number of nuclear weapons reached much higher levels in the latter part of the First Nuclear Age. Vertical proliferation reached astounding levels with 125,000 warheads and more coming on the scene just from the U.S. and the Soviet Union. (The U.S. produced approximately 70,000 and the USSR 55,000.) But because of the arms control and eventual arms reductions efforts, the relationships between especially the U.S. and the Soviet Union were stable.

Possibly, India and Pakistan have just passed their most unstable period. Perhaps, with the inevitable impact of cricket diplomacy, and the results of the current bilateral dialogs, a growing infrastructure of restraints will evolve into a mature deterrent system that will reflect stability and the prospects for enhanced confidence building measures. (By the way, when I speak of cricket, may I explain that I spent my freshman year of high school in England in 1950. There, I was the wicket keeper for Faraday House, one of the four houses in my school. I'm one of the few Americans who actually knows what a silly short leg is.)

Bracken's thesis in his book stresses that the non-proliferation regime that was put in place in 1968 was remarkably successful. Most experts believed we would have 25 proliferators by the 1970s. He notes that the first "outlaw bomb" was the Indian test in 1974, that is unless you count the Israeli capability which he puts as being realized in 1969. While these did occur along with South Africa, it was the May 1998 events that he marks as actually ending the First Nuclear Age. The nuclear age marked by a competition between two superpowers was replaced by a nuclear age which "seemed to emerge out of a hodgepodge of unrelated regional issues."² Please hold this thought, as I wish to return to it later in my presentation.

Other characteristics of this 2nd Nuclear Age were identified as: an era less Eurocentric in nature; more nationalistic – in fact, reflecting "national insecurities that are not comprehensible to outsiders whose security is not endangered"³ with very intense almost hysterical nationalism being involved. He sees a kind of nuclear deterrence existing where decisions are made involving rage and religious hatreds negating the western experience. He contends Nuclear warfare during the First Nuclear Age, between the U.S. and USSR was approached with a certain "detachment and rationality." (May I disagree somewhat here. I would agree that among professionals, here was no hate, no invective toward our Soviet adversaries. We as professionals were going to do our job. – Later, several

² *Ibid.*, p. 110.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

years after the fall of the Soviet Union in one of our meetings with active and retired military officers from Northeast Asia, a Russian general noted that there now existed hatred toward the U.S. among his troops. This may have moderated to some extent in recent years after 9/11, but is still open to question.

But, if Bracken is trying to imply that there was no invective, no hate during the U.S.-Soviet competition, I would like to remind him of John Foster Dulles, Senator Joseph McCarthy and the members of the John Birch Society. One of the most unforgettable examples of this kind of disruptive rhetoric was Dulles' 1952 *Life* magazine article entitled "A Policy of Boldness." In this scathing criticism of the Soviet Union Dulles writes about the moral law that exists in the world that sets out clearly right and wrong. "This law has been trampled by the Soviet rulers, and for that violation they can and should be made to pay."⁴)

Bracken opines, however, that the western model is certainly less than satisfactory as we chart a new course into a 21st Century non-proliferation regime. To complicate matters further, his last common characteristic for new nuclear weapon states focuses on their relative poverty.

All this introductory data on Paul Bracken's work is to set the stage and to indicate my general agreement. I do agree that we have entered a 2nd Nuclear Age and I stated that in a June 1998 speech which marked my recovery from a triple bypass operation. Quoting Rebecca Johnson of *Disarmament Diplomacy*, I noted: "Rather than berate India and Pakistan, the Permanent Five need to work collectively to remove the basis for insecurity in South Asia, but as we know, this is also part of the problem. Regional conflict resolution needs to be initiated, as well as bilateral agreements for insuring stability, coupled with an overhaul of the entire worldwide non-proliferation regime."

I firmly believe that our answers to a new regime for the 2nd Nuclear Age must be based on responsible and able regional groupings -- associations that can address regional security issues with a familiarity and commitment unmatched by globally oriented institutions. To make my case clear, permit me to draw on the experiences we have had in Northeast Asia as we have tried to realize a Limited Nuclear Weapons Free Zone for that region. When I speak of "we" in this case, I refer to the Center for International Strategy, Technology and Policy which I founded in 1990 at Georgia Tech after 31 years in government -- 28 in the Air Force and three as a senior civilian directing the Institute for National Strategic Studies in Washington, D.C.

⁴ Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), p. 127. The *Life* magazine article appeared 19 May 1952 on pages 146-157.

When the DPRK and ROK governments agreed to a non-aggression pact and to de-nuclearize the peninsula in 1991, as a Northeast Asian specialist I applauded the progress, but believed that such a bilateral agreement must be buttressed by a regional agreement involving all the neighboring states. I believed the best vehicle to get such reinforcement would be through a nuclear weapons free zone that would have a secretariat, an inspection structure, and an agency for dealing with the questions that would inevitably arise and need rapid attention.

I came up with a simple initial design that was a circle 1200nm in radius centered on the DMZ in Korea. My first thoughts were to ban all nuclear weapons activity from the area, but took pains to insure the Russians could maintain their nuclear bastion in the Sea of Okhotsk. I took less pains to moderate the impact on China's deployed resources, and paid for that later. In Feb 1992 I traveled to Washington where the concept was vetted among 24 top members of the Executive Department – remember I am a retired Colonel and want to keep my retirement. After a vigorous four-hour exchange, I was given a go-ahead that basically recognized that perhaps there was an opening window of opportunity and if Endicott wanted to make a fool of himself, he would not be prevented.

The first presentation to an international body was at a conference we co-sponsored in Beijing the next month – March of 1992. Seventy-five participants from all the states of NEA including North and South Korea, Mongolia, China, Japan, Canada, HongKong, Russia and the U.S. heard the presentation and all but one country were positively excited. The one delegation unhappy with the idea was that of the PRC. I had stepped on 60% of their deployed assets and it was not a pretty scene.

Discouraged but not undaunted, we followed that meeting with a trilateral in Atlanta the next March between unofficial representatives from China, Japan and the U.S. To my astonishment the Chinese delegation presented a common and united front -- this time in favor of “positive consideration” of the concept. A week later, my joy soon gave way to a realization that the DPRK was about to leave the NPT. No one in NEA wanted a North Korea with nuclear arms, including China.

The next few years were filled with trips to all the capitals of the states of NEA, and discussions with Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs. That is, except for the DPRK, I kept in touch with them through their officials at the United Nations. In January 1995 I called together five general-level officers to work on a basic draft agreement. A General from the ROK, a Lt. General from Japan, Major Generals from Russia and China and myself made up the invited Senior Panel. We met for

five difficult weeks that were marked by almost as much disagreement as agreement. However, what finally emerged was a consensus document that called for a limited nuclear weapons free zone in NEA. A total ban in the area was unrealistic, and this group of seasoned pragmatists agreed that the perfect is the enemy of the good (an old Russian saying). Only tactical weapons would be banned; the area included in the ban would have to include some American territory and not so much Chinese. The heart of the agreement was the establishment of a regional agency charged with inspectorate duties as well as overall administrative responsibilities. The concept was an endorsement of starting small so at least a beginning could be made. As a group we took our final product to Washington, D.C., New York, Boston and San Francisco and collectively, as a team, briefed the arms control community and other interested parties.

Once that was accomplished we began to expand the number and type of participants to include retired diplomats, scientists, academics and peace activists. This ever increasing group met first in Buenos Aires, then Bordeaux, and over the next seven years in Moscow, Helsinki, Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, and Ulaan Baatar for plenary meetings and Shanghai and Vancouver for planning sessions. At each meeting some new development or refinement was added to the formulation that represented the maturation of the idea and reflected the growing willingness by all parties to improve the product.

It went forward in the face of determined opposition by the U.S. arms control community that doggedly opposed any multilateral treatment of the issue with so many verification problems. The issue was to be solved in a bilateral context and in the terms of a dogma that was not subject to review. Some other sectors of the U.S. government, however, appreciated what we were attempting and we went forward. By the Helsinki meeting we had incorporated official observers into the meetings so all ideas – good and bad – got back to the respective governments. Mongolia was added to our talks as they had much to provide with their past experience and present nuclear-free status.

While we can not claim victory yet, we can point to the on-going six-party talks and see many of the items we struggled over in our almost ten-year process of keeping an idea alive. We all would prefer to see Mongolia join in the talks as it has distinct ties to North Korea its government and its people. The endorsement of a nuclear-free peninsula; the need for an on-going security forum; and ultimately the need to resolve the issue regionally and not bilaterally have been embraced. However, it was the joint development or formulation of a concept from the very beginning to its present state that we take greatest pride. The appreciation of each member's

particular security situation was fundamental to the progress that was made. It is clear that it is with the full participation of the states of the region involved when meaningful progress can be made.

With a draft treaty agreed to by participants at our Ulaan Baatar meeting in 2002, the members of the LNWFZ-NEA look forward to our next plenary meeting to be held in Cheju-do, ROK this coming summer. There we will review the progress made by the Track I Six-Party Talks and consider the question of the need of a continuing Track II effort in the face of such massive official involvement.

Whatever the results of our meeting in Cheju-do, the lesson to me from the experiences that span more than the past decade point to a new non-proliferation regime that is based on regional sub-systems, not a global infrastructure driven by central concerns often out of touch with the security realities of specific regional interests. In this sense, I believe you can already tell where I am heading. It is time to create a non-proliferation system for the 2nd Nuclear Age that addresses specifically the needs of the regional hot spots of the world.

Ultimately, states will resort to nuclear weapons when their own security interests cannot be met by alliances and global reassurances. Until we address such fundamental security concerns how can we expect to stem the tide of proliferation? When college students can find weapons design information on the web it seems imperative we move beyond the temporary expedient of trying to stop the flow of technology, in fact, trying to stop the flow of science itself. This is, to put it very clearly, a vain endeavor.

Recently, the U.S. government announced a program of new measures to counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction. In fact, President George W. Bush, introduced this initiative on 11 February 2004 in a speech at the National Defense University – my old stamping ground.⁵ It was, in a sense, part of the new pragmatism that has been evinced by the U.S. since the events of 9/11. All here in this room, recall the startling reversal of U.S. policy after that fateful day. Sanctions placed on both Pakistan and India in 1998 were lifted by a nation sadly made aware of the complexities of our new age.

In the February address President Bush outlined seven steps to “strengthen the world’s efforts to stop the spread of deadly weapons.”⁶ The President called for

⁵ President George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation,” Fort Lesley J. McNair – National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 11 February 2004. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2004/02/20040211-4.html>

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative to encompass law enforcement; strengthen laws for international control; expand Nunn-Lugar-type support for former Soviet states; banning enrichment and reprocessing functions from states not now possessing them; making the Additional Protocol for inspection mandatory to import equipment for civilian nuclear programs, create a special IAEA committee to stress safeguards and verification, and finally preventing countries under investigation for violation of non-proliferation obligations from serving on the IAEA Board of Governors.

I applaud this interest in addressing some of the symptoms of our disease, but would prefer we begin to address the causes themselves. Indeed, some of the above recommendations seem to significantly impinge on the specific guarantees of Article IV of the NPT, especially paragraph 2 of that article that loosely states that all parties will facilitate the “fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” I would prefer an acknowledgement of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the need to address such issues in the forum precisely for such modifications to treaty obligations.

Thus, we have come to a realization that the current system is need of some repair – indeed overhaul -- what might be used to address the extreme variances we face in today’s international security system? Can we look at regional nuclear free zones? Why should we call them nuclear-free zones when they probably will not be? Should we look again at Article VII which states: “Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.”

Are we not caught in the perfect is the enemy of the good dilemma again. Why should we be calling for the total absence of nuclear weapons when weapons already exist and the formation of regional security organizations could ultimately lead to a total absence and regional understanding.

These regional organizations could function as joint command centers for the exchange of critical information at the time of high crisis or tensions among member states. They could also serve as valuable points of information exchange about NGOs operating within the area, but not sanctioned by any official body. As far as South Asia is concerned, the sharing of correct information is crucial and the mistaken interpretation of available data almost led to an outbreak of hostilities in 1987 between Pakistan and India. What was an exercise, almost became an operation.

You can see where I am going. The regional institutions created should have on-going responsibilities. They should not be debating societies that meet quarterly, but should be preferred assignments for the best military personnel in the region. They should be in operation 24 hours a day and possess the best communications equipment available. Ultimately those assigned to these centers would represent their countries, but at the same time would begin to function as a team.

The new organization for the 2nd Nuclear Age should have no outliers. The regime should be universal in scope allowing all the existing nuclear free zones to interact with IAEA and the Security Council. From where I sit, it should include additional regional organizations: Northeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. Just as in the experience of the international community the League of Nations gave way to the United Nations and in our own experience the Articles of Confederation gave way to the Constitution, the NPT needs to be fashioned anew to meet the requirements of a new day and a new age.

The Permanent Five collectively must recognize that the world did not stand still after July 1968. The fundamental requirement of a successful international security system is the need to adjust to change – to face realities – even though they may not be pleasant. There certainly are more than five nuclear powers in the world today. The need for plentiful peaceful nuclear power in the years ahead will become painfully clear as we progress deeper into the 21st Century.

The NPT, as one of the successful instruments of the Cold War, now needs to be modified to reflect our changed international environment. Of course, while we are at it, let's not forget Article VI, and the commitment to nuclear disarmament. The Permanent Five need to invite all nuclear powers to review just where we are in the principal normative goal of the entire Treaty. Let us take on the overhaul of the non-proliferation system with a resolve of immediacy which it deserves. Perhaps after the NPT, let's get serious about the UN Security Council – failure to adjust to changed realities cost the world dearly in the 20th Century. Let us not fail to meet this exciting challenge for a future nearly nuclear weapons free.

In the few moments remaining, permit me to make an observation about the situation as it specifically relates to South Asia. In the last several months we have seen encouraging progress in a meaningful dialog between the leaders of India and Pakistan. In fact, our meeting here over the last two days is only the latest manifestation of a regional rapprochement that has the world at last paying attention to this incredibly important area. At the same time developments in the modernization of the arms of both states have also occurred. We have seen the testing of the Shaheen 2 and the Prithvi missiles, and we have observed the

granting of “Non-NATO” status to Pakistan in the past month.⁷ As a one time military person, I can understand the desire for the latest and best technology possible by both military services, and the need for testing in the open; I can also see the need to aid especially the forces of a nation so committed to the campaign against the al-Qaeda network so entrenched in neighboring Afghanistan.

The concern we all have with offensive capabilities is the need for adequate, no permit me to say, accurate information on the state of both militaries. I recall when the events of May 1998 were fresh on everyone’s minds, Senator Sam Nunn, the person after whom our School is named, fearing that misinformation, disinformation, or incorrect information on the status of the Indian or Pakistani forces could lead to an unintended disaster, recommended that Russia and the U.S. provide real-time data derived from our space resources to both states.

In that same vein, I would like to draw your attention to the Phalcon airborne warning and control system that recently was sold to India by Israel.⁸ Mounted in the Russian made IL-76 medium-range transport aircraft this system reportedly can simultaneously track up to 60 targets over a 700-800-km circle – supporting defensive and offensive operations.

Is it possible to begin discussions that would consider inviting Pakistani participation on board airborne Phalcon systems, or Pakistani involvement in the ground-based processing of Phalcon-derived data? Adopting some variant of this idea could demonstrate an unparalleled degree of transparency and guarantee in the least, that hostilities would not be based on mistaken interpretations of partial intelligence. It would also seem appropriate in this kind of venture to seek funding support from Nunn-Lugar-like set-asides for regional security-based groupings.

These are just the thoughts of an outsider. I am sure the defense communities of India and Pakistan will come up with better and more feasible answers to the challenges of living side-by-side in the 2nd Nuclear Age. Just let me say it has been an honor to share these thoughts with you, and participate in this important occasion.

It is my greatest hope to see the United States as your partner for peace in South Asia.

Thank you for this opportunity to address this body.

⁷ “U.S. to give Pakistan easier access to arms,” *The Japan Times*, 19 March 2004, p. 4.

⁸ “India, Israel ink the Phalcon deal,” *rediff.com*, 5 March 2004.
<http://ushome.rediff.com/news/2004/mar/05phal.htm>

Atlanta, April 2004