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
By Manuel Suarez-Mier*

Asia Times - 4/4/2016

The relationship between China and Latin America has changed radically since the Asian giant opened up to the world. There's been an explosion in trade that soared by 2,000% in the last 15 years. Today, China is the largest or second largest trading partner of the main countries in Latin America, and the connection gets larger and more complex, despite the fall in the price of commodities resulting from slower Chinese growth that's negatively affected its suppliers from the region.

The key features of the trade relationship between China and Latin America are the following:

- In the 1990s trade with China started growing fast. By 2014 China represented 12% of Latin America and the Caribbean's global trade, only because its trade with Mexico, the region's largest trader by far, is relatively small. Between 2000 and 2014 exports to China increased from 2% to 9% of the region's total, while imports from China grew from 2% to 16%. Latin America is China's fourth largest trading partner, coming only after the United States, Japan, and South Korea, according to Chinese statistics (figure 1), but these numbers vary widely depending on their source and it's difficult to gauge their reliability.
- Statistics from Latin America show that the region's trade deficit with China jumped from below \$20 billion until the mid-2000s to over \$75 billion since 2012. Mexico represented 87% of this figure last year. Trade with South America is far more balanced. Since 2014, the value of trade fell for the first time since 2009, mainly due to the drop in raw material prices and the depreciation of the region's currency with respect to the yuan.
- Commodities with relatively low-value added dominate Latin American exports to China. Medium and high-technology trade with China is very biased: barely 5% of the region's exports were products in this category, compared to 30%-40% of total Latin American




exports in the last two decades. This again is highly skewed due to very small exports from Mexico, by far the largest exporter of medium and high technology products. Meanwhile, Chinese exports in this category accounted for over 60% of its total exports to Latin America in the last decade.

This gap has created a strong political backlash in some countries against China. In Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Mexico business organizations and unions have protested loudly what is seen by them as an unfair Chinese competition in their own and global markets.

- Latin American exports to China are more concentrated than with any other trading partner. The top-three export categories to China— minerals, oil seed, and copper, followed by oil and pulp of wood, increased from 50% to 72% of total exports from 2000 to 2014. Over the same period, Latin America's exports to the world in these three categories fell from 42% to 32%.

This new and closer China-Latin America link, that's taken many by surprise and worried others which see it as a displacement of the US as the key power in the region. However, it has an ancient and alluring history that is very little known these days. What's more, these ties are witnessing its exceptional and unexpected revival.

Historic ties



The story began in 1519 with the first circumnavigation of the earth by Ferdinand Magellan's Spanish fleet and the discovery of a sea route from the Americas to Asia.

King Charles I of Spain wanted to find a direct way to travel by sea to the Spice Islands and sent his fleet under Magellan's command through the Southern-most strait in the American Continent, that now bears his name, where he discovered what he christened as the Pacific Ocean, and proceeded to claim for Spain the many lands that he encountered, including what was to be called the Philippines, where he died.

That extraordinary voyage finally returned to Spain through the Indian Ocean and the strait of Good Hope, arriving almost three years after its departure. It was clear from the surviving –only 17 out of 241– sailor's tales that the claims of Spain of the territories which Magellan had discovered were being challenged mostly by the Portuguese, and that the return route through the Indian Ocean was too dangerous.

Thus, Charles I ordered Hernán Cortés, who had just conquered what is now Mexico in 1519, to build a fleet and launch an expedition in 1527 to consolidate their claims of possession of the Spice Islands and the Philippines, since the king believed that the Treaty of Tordesillas, by which the Pope had divided the territories of the Americas between Portugal and Spain, also applied to their Asian possessions.

The trip west was relatively uneventful and reached its destination fairly fast –only 3 months– allowing the consolidation of the Philippines as Spain's colony. The problem was returning to

America because the prevailing winds and sea streams of the known routes would not allow it. It took another 40 years after the 1527 voyage, and many failed attempts, to find to find the return route, sailing north, to China and Japan.

Once that discovery was made, trade flows began in earnest and a virtual free trade deal between Latin America and Asia began, which China joined by a lucky accident. A Spanish ship near Manila rescued Chinese castaways from a ship-wreck, and their return home was helped by the government, which convinced China that Spain was well disposed towards them. Soon after Chinese vessels loaded with merchandise started arriving in Manila and in 1573 the first Chinese products reached Mexico.

For the next 250 years, mutually beneficial trade flowed between the ports of Manila via China, Korea and Japan, to cross the Pacific and arrive in upper California, not far from San Francisco, and then sail down along the coast until reaching Acapulco, in fleets that would go back and forth once a year in each direction. The merchandise was unloaded, transported by land through Mexico City to the port of Veracruz in the Gulf of Mexico, where it was uploaded for the trip to Spain.

Soon the trade flows extended to South America when the Spanish authorities realized that the commodities from the countries they controlled on its Pacific basin – basically what are now Chile, Peru and Colombia- was more economically transported via Mexico than crossing the Andes to the Atlantic. Thus, this area was integrated to the free trade flows with Asia as well.

The list of products exported by China at that time appears out of the Arabian Nights: Silk in all its forms and textures: velvet, satin, damasks, taffeta, plush and brocade; clothes like shirts, bathrobes, kimonos, capes, dresses, quilts, handkerchiefs, tablecloths and tapestries; porcelain crockery, furniture and art objects made of wood, ivory and bone; and products like musk, benzoin, amber and civet. Of course, just as other American nations joined in the free trade, this extended too to China's neighbors: fine cottons from India; carpets and rugs from Persia; and jewels and precious stones from the entire region: diamonds, rubies and jades.

The flow of America's trade with the Orient had two additional features: they were for the most part peaceable, since unlike trade on the Atlantic, it was virtually free of English pirates and French corsairs, which saved a lot of resources since it was not necessary to send armed ships with the convoys. And it became so important than it surpassed the Atlantic trade with Spain, which even tried to ban trading with Asia.

For the most part the merchandise bought in Asia from Mexico and the rest of the area was paid for with coined silver and gold from the region, but many other products, like cocoa and cochineal, found their way to the Orient. All chilies originated in Mexico but judging by the enormous impact that they had on the cuisines of all of the Asian countries, it is clear that large

amounts of chilies were exported until they started being grown in the fertile fields of the region.

This trade arrangement came to an end when Mexico and the rest of Latin America's countries became independent around the 1820s, and it has not been until recently, when China decided to join the rest of the world, that this relationship restarted in a serious way, which is precisely the aim of this column, being launched today with this historical recount that I hope my esteemed readers found interesting.

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[Expertos: La inversión de China en América Latina tendrá más potencial en el futuro](#)

América Económica - 1/03/2016

Debido a la recesión económica mundial y a la caída de los precios de las materias primas, el volumen de comercio entre China y América Latina registró una tendencia a la baja en 2015. No obstante, según los expertos de la Academia de Ciencias Sociales de China, el comercio bilateral se pasará al desarrollo diversificado y la inversión de China en la región todavía posee un enorme potencial.

El volumen comercial chino-latinoamericano disminuyó en 2015 un 10,28% interanual hasta los US\$236.545 millones. Las exportaciones de China hacia América Latina se situaron en US\$132.216 millones, un 2,97% menos que la cifra del año anterior, mientras que las importaciones también registraron un descenso del 18,09% hasta los US\$104.329 millones, de acuerdo con los datos oficiales publicados por el Ministerio de Comercio de China.

”Si bien las cifras han caído, ambas partes ahora están realizando el ajuste y la actualización de las estructuras industriales. Por ende, la cadena de valor de las industrias se conectará mejor en el futuro”, destacó Yue Yunxia, subdirectora de la oficina de eco-

nomía del instituto de estudios latinoamericanos de la Academia de Ciencias Sociales, en una entrevista exclusiva con Xinhua.

”Las inversiones de China están experimentando un período de transformación, en el que los inversores chinos empiezan a planear sus proyectos de inversión más activamente, lo que supone un cambio positivo para el desarrollo sostenible”, aseguró Yue.

”La importancia del comercio disminuirá en el futuro. En cambio, la inversión se volverá cada día más importante. Nuestras relaciones económicas y comerciales con África, Estados Unidos y Europa también han pasado por este proceso”, manifestó Jiang Shixue, experto de la Academia de Ciencias Sociales de China.

El presidente chino, Xi Jinping, asistió en julio de 2014 al encuentro de líderes de las naciones del Foro China-CELAC, y presentó en la reunión la iniciativa de crear un nuevo marco de cooperación bilateral de ”1+3+6”, en el que el ”3” representa tres motores, a saber, el comercio, la inversión y las finanzas, con el fin de fomentar la colaboración integral y pragmática. China aspira a alcanzar un comercio bilateral de US\$500.000 millones con América Latina y una inversión directa de US\$250.000 millones en la región en la próxima década.

De acuerdo con los datos del Ministro de Comercio, hasta el año 2014, el volumen de inversión directa de las empresas chinas en América Latina era de US\$106.110 millones, abarcando áreas como la energía, la minería, la agricultura, las finanzas, la construcción de infraestructuras, la manufactura y el sector servicios. En 2015, los flujos de inversión directa no financiera desde China hacia la región alcanzaron los US\$21.460 millones, un 67% por encima de la cifra de 2014. América Latina ha pasado a ser un destino importante de la inversión china en el extranjero.

Yue sostuvo que la inversión de China en América Latina subirá a largo plazo. Considerando que el PIB per cápita de China está aumentando sin cesar, esto se traducirá en el motor y la demanda de las inversiones. Por otro lado, para resolver los problemas que han surgido en el curso de la profundización de las relaciones comerciales entre ambas partes, sería recomendable ampliar las inversiones.

”Somos fuerzas nuevas en América Latina, por eso es muy natural que encontremos muchos problemas”, señaló Yue, quien también explicó que la mayoría de los países latinoamericanos cuenta con un sistema legal muy completo en materia de protección medioambiental y regulación laboral. Las empresas chinas deben observar las leyes y adaptarse a la sociedad local.

Según la opinión de Jiang, el problema fundamental en el desarrollo de asociaciones bilaterales es la falta de entendimiento mutuo. Necesitan atraer más turistas a China para que vean la imagen real del país, así como alentar a más estudiantes latinoamericanos a que estudien la cultura china, a fin de promover el entendimiento mutuo y cimentar una base sólida para el desarrollo sostenible de las relaciones bilaterales.

Además de las inversiones, los préstamos de China a la región latinoamericana también se han convertido en un foco de atención para todo el mundo, especialmente tras la caída de los precios internacionales del petróleo y los cambios políticos en varios países, que han provocado preocupaciones de solvencia de las naciones latinoamericanas.

”Hasta el momento, el reembolso de los préstamos no presenta problemas. En el futuro, si la situación de la región sigue empeorando, podríamos modificar los acuerdos con los países, pero el incumplimiento de contrato es casi imposible”, indicó Yue en respuesta a dichas preocupaciones.

”Antes ofrecíamos los préstamos directamente a los gobiernos locales y las compañías estatales, pero en el futuro, los concedidos a las empresas pequeñas y medianas que tienen relaciones comerciales con América Latina podrían aumentar, con miras a reducir riesgos y resolver el exceso de capacidad de producción de China”, explicó la experta.

”Pese a los factores desfavorables, el flujo general de crédito del gigante asiático a la zona latinoamericana se mantendrá sin cambio en el futuro”, añadió Yue.

[La inversión china en América Latina creció un 67 % interanual en flujos no financiados](#)

EFE - Santo Domingo - 1/3/2016

La inversión directa de China en los flujos no financiados de los países de América Latina se incrementó un 67 por ciento, pasando de 12,850 millones de dólares invertidos de 2014 a los 21,460 millones de dólares registrados durante 2015.

Así lo expuso el representante de la Oficina Comercial de la República Popular China en Santo Domingo, Gao Shoujian, al participar en una conferencia organizada por el Ministerio de Economía, Planificación y Desarrollo (MEPyD) en marco de las actividades conmemorativas de su décimo aniversario.

Shoujian destacó la intensificación de las relaciones con América Latina en los últimos 15 años y destacó que, en 2014, el volumen de comercio alcanzó 26,360 millones de dólares, un incremento de 20 veces en comparación con el año 2000.

En el evento, el coordinador principal del Centro de Desarrollo de la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE), Rolando Avendaño, presentó el informe "Perspectivas Económicas 2016", elaborado en conjunto con la Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (Cepal) y el Banco de Desarrollo de América Latina (CAF).

En el documento, los tres organismos recomiendan a los países de la región que mejoren y profundicen sus relaciones comerciales con China, analicen sus crecientes vínculos comerciales, y las tendencias en la relación con el gigante asiático, acorde con los cambios de estrategia de desarrollo chino.

La OCDE agrupa 34 estados, entre ellos Alemania, Australia, Austria, Bélgica, Canadá, Estados Unidos, Francia, Reino Unido, Italia, Japón y México, países que aglutinan el 80% del PIB mundial y el 70% del mercado global.

Entre los objetivos principales de la cooperación para los próximos 10 años, el gobierno chino prevé que el comercio bilateral llegue a 500,000 millones de dólares y que la inversión china acumulada en la región alcance la cifra de 250,000 millones.

Aunque el estudio reconoce una expansión comercial sin precedentes entre China y América Latina en estos últimos 15 años, período en el que los flujos se han multiplicado por 22, este modelo de crecimiento se basa en materias primas y sus límites ya se están demostrando.

"Las materias primas representaron el 73% de las exportaciones de la región a China (comparado con el 41% mundial), mientras que los productos tecnológicos manufacturados solo alcanzaron el 6% (comparado con el 42% mundial), consigna el estudio. Las exportaciones latinoamericanas de productos mineros y combustibles fósiles a China crecieron al ritmo de 16% anual de 2001 a 2010, frente al 12% de las exportaciones agrícolas.

La reducción de la demanda de materias primas por una mayor dependencia de China del consumo en relación con la inversión comienza a sentirse, junto con una caída de precios que afecta esas exportaciones latinoamericanas de bienes primarios.

En tal sentido, el estudio subraya que, a medida que América Latina ha ido disminuyendo su comercio de materias primas, en particular con China, ha descendido el crecimiento económico regional, lo que explica la actual desaceleración, y refuerza los pronósticos de crecimiento de cerca del 3%, inferior a lo esperado por América Latina, subraya el informe.

Más allá

Por su parte el secretario general de la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA), Luis Almagro, subrayó ayer la necesidad de lograr que el crecimiento en los intercambios entre China y Latinoamérica y el Caribe sea "sostenible" y que las relaciones vayan "más allá del precio" de las materias primas. Almagro hizo estas declaraciones durante una conferencia que pronunció este martes en el Instituto de América Latina de la Academia China de Ciencias Sociales (ILAS CASS) de Pekín, adonde llegó el domingo para un viaje de tres días.

"Hay que lograr que las relaciones sean estables, tenemos que tener una visión estratégica conjunta", apuntó Almagro, quien añadió que "las relaciones basadas en las exportaciones son insostenibles a largo plazo" y que el objetivo es que estas no sean "vulnerables a ciclos a la baja como el que estamos experimentando".

Pese a que el secretario de la OEA, que fue embajador de Uruguay en China entre 2005 y 2010, reconoció que "estamos en un punto alto" en las relaciones entre la segunda economía mundial y los países latinoamericanos y caribeños, también puntualizó que se trata de un "momento clave" para el desarrollo de su futuro.

El presidente Macri dice que China está preparada para revisar acuerdos firmados

Con inversiones de Estados Unidos, la Argentina reanudará la explotación de uranio y revisará "errores" en importaciones previas.

[President Macri says China willing to amend signed accords](#)

By Pablo Rosendo Gonzalez

Bloomberg - 1/4/2016

The Argentine government is asking China to revise a nuclear reactor accord signed by the previous administration as it seeks uranium providers from the U.S. ahead of resuming output, two people with knowledge of the situation said.

China is open to amending dam and nuclear energy contracts that it signed with the previous Argentine government administration

La Nacion reported Friday. The Buenos Aires-based newspaper report cited an interview with President Mauricio Macri after he met with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping in Washington, where a nuclear summit is being held.

Resuming uranium output, which was halted in 1997, is a pending issue for South America's second-largest economy, said an Energy and Mining Ministry official, who asked not to be named as he isn't a ministry spokesman. Argentina, which has three nuclear power reactors, is building a fourth unit and has plans for a fifth one using Chinese financing.

Argentina now imports uranium from countries such as Russia and Kazakhstan for its own use as well as to export it after enrichment to countries such as Brazil.

'Included Mistakes'

The original accord needs to be revised because it "included mistakes" such as China having the exclusive right to find providers to supply uranium, the two people with knowledge said. Wording in the accord didn't allow U.S. companies to participate.

At the same summit, an unidentified U.S. listed company signed a memorandum of understanding with UrAmerica Argentina SA, which owns an uranium mine in Argentina, according to the second person with knowledge of the situation, who asked not to be named as talks are private.

The MOU would be worth \$150 million if a final deal is reached, the person said. The accord would include a technology transfer agreement in which the U.S. company would supply uranium and teach UrAmerica production methods, according to one of the people.

"The only thing I can say is UrAmerica will be able to produce uranium in Argentina in 2019," Omar Adra, UrAmerica chief executive officer, said in a telephone interview from Washington. He declined to elaborate further.

América Latina necesita un plan para el plan de China sobre América Latina

China mantiene su estrategia de aumentar las inversiones en la región.

América Latina tiene que agradecer que el país proporciona financiamiento pero no tiene una estrategia propia para usarlo para desarrollar la infraestructura y el comercio intrarregional.

[Latin America needs a plan to China's Latin America plan](#)

By Kevin Gallagher

Latin America Goes Global - 31/3/2016

It was a heady time in Latin America from 2003 to 2013—with economies across the region growing at an average rate faster than any decade since the 1970s. Driven largely by China's growth and appetite for natural resources, even in the midst of the boom, a number of presidents and observers expressed concern that the region's dependence on its resource-led growth could throw it back to the 19th century and the famed "resource curse."

There are clearly signs that there is a curse in the region. Latin American economies contracted in 2015 and are projected to grow one tenth of one percent in 2016, according to the World Bank. At the same time, the private sector is retreating from the region at an alarming rate, with negative net capital flows to Latin America for the first time since 1998. Development banks that are supposed to be there to help during downturns are also on the retreat; the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank cut lending in 2015 by 5 percent and 14 percent respectively.

China, however, is not turning its back on Latin America, despite its own economic slow down. China has pledged to increase exports to \$500 billion and foreign investment to \$250 billion by 2025. And, to show they mean it, China's two development banks, the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China, provided upwards of \$29 billion in loans to Latin American governments in 2015—according to new estimates published by Boston University's Global Economic Governance Initiative and the Washington-based think tank The Inter-American Dialogue. A three-fold increase from 2014, China's 2015 finance to Latin America is more than the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and the Development Bank of Latin America combined.

In addition to the \$29 billion in bilateral loans in 2015, China also set up \$35 billion in multilateral finance platforms for Latin America, including a \$20 billion China-LAC Industrial Cooperation Investment Fund and a \$10 billion China-Latin America Infrastructure Fund. In addition, China pumped another \$5 billion into the China-Latin America Cooperation Fund that was set up in 2014. Finally, to coordinate this relationship, in 2015 China teamed up with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and put together a cooperation plan to allocate these funds and discuss broader issues such as industrialization, infrastructure and sustainable development.

China has a clear Latin America strategy: invest and trade with Latin America to gain access to strategic natural resources and strategic markets for national champion firms and policy banks—and make lots of friends along the way.

The problem is, the countries of Latin America don't have a plan for China.

Lots of countries have 'shovel ready' projects for development banks, but they are too often just roads to mines or presidential pet projects, rather than regional plans for smart infrastructure and logistics that spur innovation and inter-regional trade.

CELAC needs to be credited with having the promise of a regional institutional body set up to address these issues and have a unified approach to China, but it lacks any significant staffing and, as the political trends in the region change, it may soon lack presidential level backing as well. Regional blocs in Latin America come and go as political and economic winds change, with each new set of governments creating their own short-lived initiatives. As I discuss in my new book, *The China Triangle: Latin America's China Boom and the Fate of the Washington Consensus*, this has to change.

CELAC should become part of a tripartite body to formulate and implement a regional China plan—along with the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) and the The United Nations Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). The CAF is a regional development bank, without the United States and Canada at the helm, that now rivals the Inter-American Development Bank for total financing to Latin American governments—and is the leader in terms of infrastructure finance. ECLAC has been providing sound economic advice for decades from a LAC regional perspective.

ECLAC has the facilities and convening power for regional discussion on economic issues and CAF has proven itself to be a legitimate regional development financier of the region that can rise above economic and political swings. A tripartite body with these three organizations would be able to administer and perhaps even match funds (through the CAF) the boon of funds coming in from China. At the same time, the collective group could serve as a knowledge leader regarding the most productive and regional use of such funds by leveraging the intellectual re-

sources of ECLAC at the same time that it could and establish CELAC as a regional platform to engage China.

In the absence of reform at the Western-backed development banks or a new source of optimism in the private sector, Latin American governments have to be thankful that Chinese finance is available. That said, the onus is on Latin American governments to make this new finance work for long-term economic growth that is socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable. The region can't afford not to put together a regional plan to deal with China, but CELAC can't do it on its own. It will need to team up with the CAF and ECLAC, and come up with a plan to manage the \$500 billion in trade and \$250 billion in finance on offer.

La “firmeza” de China en el Mar del Sur de China ¿es solo por nacionalismo?

China es acusada de nacionalismo pero el gobierno trata de evitarlo y lleva adelante una política pacífica. Otros países de la zona, especialmente Vietnam, también ocuparon lugares en disputa en el Mar del Sur de China.

[Is China's 'Assertiveness' in the South China Sea All About Nationalism?](#)

By Jin Kai

The Diplomat - 11/04/2016

In a number of recent discussions I've been a part of, “nationalism” has been repeatedly raised to describe China's policies toward its territorial disputes with its neighbors. Also, this term has often appeared in international media stories about China's stance in the East and South China Seas disputes (for example, [here](#), [here](#), and [here](#).) The idea is that “nationalism” is unnecessarily – or even dangerously – playing an important role in China's policies toward the ongoing maritime disputes in the region. Is that true?

Describing China's stance as merely “nationalist” oversimplifies China's strategies, policies, and behaviors. These critiques also have a bad habit of foregoing a discussion of nationalism in a general sense and instead implying that only China's disagreements with others are proof of “narrow nationalism” or even “expansionism.” These misconceptions – that China's behaviors are only driven by nationalism, and that Chinese nationalism is somehow distinct from similar tendencies in, say, Vietnam or the Philippines – only cloud an already complicated situation.

When it comes to territorial disputes, states can be more or less “confident” or “assertive” in their behavior, whether they are “nationalist” or not. In the South China Sea, the other claimants have broken their promises, incrementally occupied a majority of the islands and rocks, and “unilaterally” changed the status quo; that situation is causing China’s reactions now. But accusations against China have dominated, perhaps simply because China is China. In a statement given to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense David Shear already made it clear that in the Spratly islands, “Vietnam has 48 outposts; the Philippines, 8; China, 8; Malaysia, 5, and Taiwan, 1.” No wonder Greg Austin, writing for *The Diplomat* in 2015, raised a sharp question: “Who Is the Biggest Aggressor in the South China Sea?”

There is a clear line between preserving sovereign rights and using territorial disputes as an excuse for expansionism. China is often accused of the latter, but the reasons for China to have reminded relatively restrained (and thus less nationalistic) are obvious. In both the East and the West, history has proven that extreme nationalists can go to war with neighboring countries when two driving factors are present: the accumulation of national power, and the emergence of a collective identity. Such was the case in the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. In East Asia’s modern history, China was a victim of its neighbor’s extreme nationalism and imperialism.

Now China is rising rapidly in both economic power and national pride. Given the enduring maritime disputes between China and its neighbors, some believe that history is going to repeat itself: a “nationalistic” China would go for expansionism, and might even “claim its revenge” for historical wrongs. This is a misperception – or perhaps a “preconception” – of China’s firmly intended peaceful rise. This theory obviously overlooks the fact that, even regarding the disputes over Chinese sovereign interests to which other claimants had no objections before, China still had always proposed a peaceful solution through negotiations. Meanwhile, as Austin pointed out, other countries responded with “incremental occupations” and Vietnam even “doubled its holdings” in the past years while “China has not physically occupied additional features.” So who really is guilty of “expansionism”?

Overall, there doesn’t seem to be a direct link between China’s “reactive assertiveness” and “nationalism,” although there is a certain level of nationalist sentiments, for example, among China’s netizens. The Chinese government, however, wants to avoid having its policies fall into the negative spectrum of nationalist sentiments. Blaming China for its “nationalism” in the South China Sea issue may be an case of “judging by size,” and it is not helping to mitigate tensions.

Editor responsable del Boletín: Julio Sevares.