

## Grupo de Trabajo sobre China

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## China teme una espiral deflacionaria

La caída de los precios de las manufacturas afectadas por capacidad excedente y de los precios al consumidor presenta un problema para el gobierno chino. Según algunas opiniones China no va a repetir la deflación de Japón en décadas pasadas, pero el Banco Central dio muestras de que eso suceda bajando las tasas de interés. Una deflación del país asiático afectaría la economía mundial.

### China: fear of a deflationary spiral

by Josh Noble and Gabriel Wildau

Financial Times—30/11/2014

Falling prices for manufacturers plagued by overcapacity present a problem for Beijing's policy makers.

The 600,000-square-metre China Commodity City in Yiwu city, often referred to as "Walmart on steroids", is one of the world's largest wholesale markets.

Traders from the Middle East, Russia and Africa come to the market in eastern Zhejiang province to browse a staggering array of products from umbrellas to buttons to refrigerator magnets commemorating every city in the world – many made in one of the small factories dotted around the city's fringe.

But as the holiday season approaches, Guo Wei, factory manager at China Zhongsheng Crafts Co, which makes plastic Christmas trees for export to the US, the UK, Australia and Japan, is struggling to cope. For some products, the company is even selling below cost.

"Sales revenue is holding up OK, but when it comes to prices, customers want them lower and lower. They all say the economy isn't good," said Ms Guo. "Some of our own products aren't profitable any more but we still make them to keep our customers happy".

Cheaper Christmas trees may sound like good news for western consumers. But falling prices in China pose a rising threat to economies across the globe, many of which are grappling with their own issues of weak demand and troublingly low inflation.

After a decade in which rapid growth and investment gobbled up China's enormous output, many of its factories – like those in Yiwu – are finding it difficult to shift stock. Demand at home and abroad has been stalling, leaving many industries with chronic overcapacity, especially in basic commodities like steel, glass and cement. For many, the only answer is to keep cutting prices.

The result is reflected in China's official statistics, which show that so-called producer prices have been in outright deflation for nearly three years. Perhaps even more worrying, consumer prices have dropped to a near five-year low of 1.6 per cent on an annual basis in October. "You think there's a problem in the eurozone? There's a far bigger problem in China," says Albert Edwards, strategist at Société Générale.

China is the world's top exporting nation, and the main trading partner with dozens of countries. As its manufacturers drop prices to increase sales, the impact is being felt across the world, from the factory floor to the shop shelf. With policy makers in many economies – Europe and Japan especially – worried about falling prices, China's own ability to boost inflation is becoming a key part of the puzzle. As George Magnus, an economic adviser to UBS, puts it: "The rest of us need Chinese deflationary pressures like a hole in the head".

Optimists say China is unlikely to tip into the kind of stubborn deflationary spiral that has dogged neighbouring Japan for two decades and is dominating the policy debate in Europe. Growth, for now at least, remains above 7 per cent a year, making it an important engine of global demand.

But in a possible sign of rising concerns about disinflation, the People's Bank of China cut interest rates in November for the first time since 2012.

"It's a clear indication of how heavy deflationary pressure in China can be these days," said François Perrin, head of China equities at BNP Paribas Investment Partners.

For over a decade, China has faced accusations of exporting deflation. In 2002, Haruhiko Kuroda – then a Japanese finance ministry official, now head of the Bank of Japan – warned in the Financial Times that China’s entry into the World Trade Organization would add a “powerful deflationary force” to the global economy.

Just over a year later, the US Federal Reserve published a discussion paper entitled: “Is China exporting deflation?”, but it concluded that the Chinese economy was “too small” to have an impact. A decade on, China’s place in the global economy has been transformed, both as a supplier of goods and a source of demand for raw materials. The Chinese slowdown has been a key factor in falling commodity prices, such as oil, which sank to a four-year low last week.

### **The drop in global energy costs is feeding through to weaker inflation**

Everywhere, but many see China’s current bout of disinflation as a symptom of deeper problems that are unique to the world’s second-largest economy: chronic overcapacity, insufficient demand and faltering growth. All are side effects of a top-down system where cosseted state enterprises are reluctant to retrench and local governments are engorged with easy credit.

The country has a long history of excessive development across industries, from solar panels and ship-building to steel and chemicals. Many companies in these sectors are now on life support and are increasingly reliant for funding on China’s vast shadow banking system, where “non-bank institutions” sell wealth management products that offer high returns on investments regarded – rightly or wrongly – as underwritten by the state. Even the downturn in the housing market can be attributed to the burden of oversupply in many cities.

Last week, government researchers put a figure on wasteful spending. By their calculations, \$6.8tn has been squandered on “ineffective investment” – such as needless steel mills, ghost cities and empty stadiums – since the start of the 2009 stimulus launched to buffer China from the global financial crisis.

Overcapacity is largely the result of pressures on local governments. The performance of local officials has long been evaluated based on gross domestic product, creating an incentive to maintain production even at unprofitable factories. Excess capacity has unfortunate consequences: falling prices undermine corporate profitability and lead to stress in the banking system. Local officials lean on banks to relax lending standards for companies that would otherwise be forced to close down. Unprofitable manufacturers pile on ever more debt but avoid bankruptcy and maintain production, adding more downward pressure on prices.

The central government has pledged to stop measuring officials’ performance mainly based on GDP, but this change will take years to trickle down to lower levels of government.

Deflation has also fuelled the build-up of risk in the financial system. Cut off from bank finance, companies in oversupplied industries, especially privately owned ones, pay exorbitant interest rates in the shadow banking system. Falling prices at the factory gate make the burden of that growing debt even heavier, raising the risk of defaults.

Overcapacity is not just a local problem: sinking prices for Chinese-made goods affect costs globally. Before the financial crisis, that helped drive a consumer boom in the west. But now excess supply risks worsening the problem of falling prices in developed economies.

Eswar Prasad, economics professor at Cornell University, says: “Disinflation and weak demand growth in China could have adverse spillover effects on other countries grappling with even more severe versions of these two problems”.

Deflation inflicts a dual blow on an economy. It increases the burden of debt in real terms, something that China, which Standard Chartered estimates has a debt-to-GDP ratio above 250 per cent, can ill afford.

Falling prices can also hold back consumption, as people delay purchases in expectation of even cheaper prices. But as China tries to shift its economy from credit-fuelled investment towards consumer-driven growth, it needs its citizens to go shopping.

In the scenario of higher spending, China’s policy makers could do very little, at least until the prospect of outright deflation becomes a more serious risk.

“Cheaper commodities benefit consuming countries which drive global demand”, says Fred Neumann,

chief Asia economist at HSBC.

If prices continue to tick down, Beijing has several options for generating demand. But as central bankers in Japan and Europe have found, stirring inflation with monetary policy is no mean feat when dealing with years of excess credit growth. Many analysts expect further rate cuts and more targeted easing measures for some sectors. This could support consumer spending and reduce the debt burden on companies.

But there are questions about the impact of rate cuts on the broader economy. Lower borrowing costs will largely benefit hulking state-backed companies, helping them to keep going even if they are not economically viable.

Rate cuts could also signal the status quo will be preserved, which “might give the market an impression that the new government once again uses credit easing to stimulate growth”, said Lu Ting, chief China economist at Bank of America Merrill Lynch.

Under President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang, China has laid out a path towards comprehensive reform designed to introduce real market forces. But there has been little to show for it. “I think the majority in policy circles still talk about reform in a positive way,” says Zhang Zhiwei, economist at Deutsche Bank. “The question is about timing and how to do it”.

Until then, China’s economic model remains reliant on the trusted drivers of growth – credit-fuelled investment and exports. However, both are under increasing strain. Credit growth has been explosive in recent years since the financial crisis, while weak global growth means that the export engine is stalling, and driving down prices.

The worry is that China decides to take the nuclear option to fan inflation at home: currency devaluation. A sharp drop in the value of the renminbi could boost exports, and help use up excess capacity; it would also offset the drag of weaker commodity prices. But raising import prices would be bad news for Chinese consumers, as would higher input costs for manufacturers.

Analysts say the chances of a devaluation are still slim, but growing. “I don’t think this is likely, but the weaker Chinese data gets, the greater the pressure on policy makers to go for the easy option of devaluation,” says Mr Neumann. “Should China opt to depreciate its exchange rate, this would be a game changer.”

Such a move could prove disastrous for efforts elsewhere, notably Europe and Japan, to fight deflation. China is the world’s top exporter to the EU, meaning that a significant drop in the price of its goods would put fresh downward pressure on already very low inflation trends in the eurozone.

But the aggressive expansion of the BoJ’s quantitative easing programme has raised the stakes. The yen has tumbled to a record low against the renminbi, while South Korea has put the market on notice that it is watching the Japanese currency closely. If the BoJ sparks a regional currency war, China may not be able to remain neutral.

“If you’re trying to crush a credit bubble, which the Chinese are, the last thing you need is a rapid appreciation in the exchange rate,” says SocGen’s Mr Edwards. “Economically, China doesn’t have a lot of choice. It’s just an inevitability, and Japan is the straw that broke the camel’s back.”

## Corporate debt

### Historic default fails to clean up financial sector

In March, solar-panel maker Chaori Solar failed to meet an interest payment on its bonds, marking China’s first default of the modern era.

Investors expected a wave of corporate bankruptcies and defaults to follow, which would have damaged confidence but would have cleared away some of the excess capacity that has been pushing prices down. Raising the potential for corporate failures was expected to lead to more rational pricing of risk, as investors began to realise not everything was underwritten by the state.

Reality has proved rather different. Fears that injecting too much risk into the system too quickly would close the window for refinancing companies have overridden expectations. Regional authorities were also afraid of playing host to corporate failures.

Instead, local government officials prevented companies from going bust by strong-arming banks into making new loans. Defaults failed to emerge, while non-performing loan rates at large banks – although rising – have remained extremely low.

Chaori bondholders were ultimately bailed out by a state-owned bad bank in October. Huarong, another of China's bad banks, also rescued those invested in “China Credit Equals Gold #1”, a trust product that had teetered on the brink of default in January. In both cases, the bailout was largely kept quiet, leading to assumptions of state-directed assistance.

There have been attempts at shaking up the status quo and introducing more market forces into the economy. Many large state-owned enterprises have this year announced restructuring or asset spin-offs. Sinopec recently sold a \$17.4bn stake in its gas station business, Citic Group is injecting \$37bn of assets into its Hong Kong-listed arm, while China's three mobile operators are exploring a stake sale of their pooled towers business.

But these measures remain piecemeal, and are in many ways simply experiments at the margins of the economy.

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## China hace su revolución tranquila

La apertura de la bolsa de Shanghái a los capitales extranjeros es la última etapa de la apertura de China a la mundialización.

La Chine fait sa révolution tranquile ([Video](#))

Alternatives Economiques–13/11/2014

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## El Banco Central de China es cauteloso sobre las políticas de relajación monetaria, pero es lo que la economía necesita

En años anteriores de alto crecimiento, el People's Bank of China (banco central) mantuvo las tasas elevadas. Pero ahora el crecimiento de la economía y de los precios están por debajo de los objetivos oficiales (7,5% y 3,5% anual respectivamente). Por otra parte se redujo el ingreso de capitales externos, lo cual afecta la liquidez. Como respuesta el banco central tomó varias medidas destinadas a inyectar liquidez y reducir el costo del crédito, para promover la economía y combatir la deflación.

China's central bank is wary of easing monetary policy, but that is what the economy needs

The Economist–22/11/2014

IN BEIJING, a city of grandiose government offices, the central bank stands out for its modesty. Its headquarters are small and dated; plans for a big, gleaming extension have so far come to nothing. Cramped as they are, however, these digs are an apt symbol of the central bank's restraint.

For nearly four years the People's Bank of China (PBOC) has classified monetary policy as “prudent”, which is supposedly a neutral stance—not too tight, not too loose. In reality it has been tightening, to cool an overheated property market and slow the alarming accretion of debt. At the same time, the central bank has chipped away at vestiges of central planning with changes to its currency and interest-rate re-

gimes. The PBOC is far from independent, but under Zhou Xiaochuan (pictured), its governor since 2002, it has acquired real clout as it has doggedly pursued its dual objectives of restraint and reform.

These two aims were complementary in 2011, when the central bank first embraced prudence. Nominal growth was still running at 18%, a heady pace even by Chinese standards; slowing breakneck investment was essential. Yet times have changed. The economy is now on track for its weakest year since 1990, sliding below the government's goal of 7.5% growth; inflation is at a five-year low, nearly two percentage points below the official 3.5% target. The central bank faces mounting calls to lower rates. But advisers say it fears sending the wrong message: by easing, it might signal an end to restraint and, by extension, to reform.

The central bank's answer to this dilemma has been to loosen monetary policy, but in a covert fashion. It lent the state-owned China Development Bank one trillion yuan (\$163 billion), according to rumours that dribbled into local media in June. Some likened it to Chinese-style quantitative easing (QE): the central bank had in effect printed cash to rev up growth. But whereas central banks in developed economies have explained every step of their QE schemes to markets, the PBOC did not even bother to announce its activity.

Then, in September and October, it launched a "medium-term lending facility", injecting a further whack of cash—769.5 billion yuan, it turns out—into the economy via loans to commercial banks. Rumours spread for weeks before the central bank confirmed them on November 6th. As for the initial trillion-yuan loan, it eventually acknowledged the operation, though declined to say how much it had lent, at what rate or even to which bank.

The combined amount of the infusions, if as big as reported, would be huge—equal to more than three months of America's now-completed QE scheme when it was at its height, or to five months of Japan's current programme. The impact of China's easing, however, has been underwhelming. It has not reached the real economy. Short-term interest rates have fallen: a closely watched interbank rate is down by almost two percentage points this year, to 3.2% (see chart). But the rate at which banks lend to businesses, which matters more for growth, has remained stuck at about 7%.

The central bank's lack of transparency has sown confusion. "The more policy tools you have, the harder it is to predict changes in any one of them", says Song Yu of Goldman Sachs. A recent Barclays survey ranked the PBOC third-worst of 14 big central banks in terms of communication, behind only Turkey's and Russia's.

Even when providing partial confirmation of its covert easing, the PBOC's message was muddled. The purpose was "to guide banks to lower lending rates", it said, an apparent indication of an intention to relax policy. But in the next breath it added that the easing was to compensate for a decline in capital inflows, in order to "maintain a neutral, appropriate level of liquidity"—that is, to keep policy unchanged.

The central bank is right to be concerned about debt. Economy-wide debts have soared to 250% of GDP, up by 100 percentage points since 2008. Increases of that magnitude have presaged financial crises in other countries, so tighter policy would seem in order. Yet real interest rates have climbed to more than 8% for industrial companies, since the prices at which they sell their wares are actually declining. That, in turn, makes debts much harder to service than anticipated. Cutting interest rates while enforcing capital rules to prevent banks from issuing a gusher of new loans would be a better way to rein in debt.

The PBOC has talked instead of "fine tuning" monetary policy and making it more "targeted". The loan to China Development Bank appears to have been earmarked for public housing, which local governments have struggled to fund. To borrow from the "medium-term facility" banks were said to be obliged to reduce mortgage rates. In other words, having let air out of the property market, the PBOC now seems to be pumping it up again. "The problem is that there's no clear framework for monetary policy. They are feeling their way through," says Zhang Bin of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. "If you change targets, you should explain why."

In the background are questions about the future of the long-serving Mr Zhou. He was due to step down in 2013, having reached the official retirement age of 65. When his term was extended, it was seen as an endorsement of his reformist agenda. But a few months ago, word spread in Beijing that he might soon be replaced. Some even suggested that he had pushed too hard to deregulate interest rates.

People familiar with the PBOC say that talk of Mr Zhou's imminent retirement has since died down. Yet he will eventually depart. His legacy will be extremely positive overall: he has presided over an era of rapid growth, stable inflation and progress in financial reforms. But his final years in office are turning into a bit of a muddle.

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## Compromiso de cooperación naval entre China y Rusia

Ambos países decidieron fortalecer su cooperación bilateral y realizar ejercicio navales conjuntos para contrarrestar la influencia de EE.UU. en Asia. Su objetivo es formar un sistema de seguridad regional. Cronología histórica de la relación militar China-Rusia.

### China and Russia in naval co-operation vow

by Jamil Anderlini

Financial Times—19/11/2014

China and Russia have vowed to strengthen bilateral military co-operation and hold joint naval exercises to counter US influence in the Asia-Pacific region as a growing chorus of voices warns of a looming “new cold war”.

During a visit to Beijing where he met his Chinese counterpart and Premier Li Keqiang, Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu said the two sides “expressed our concern with the US attempts to reinforce its military political influence in the Asia-Pacific region”, Chinese and Russian state media reported.

“Our co-operation in the military spheres has great potential and the Russian side is ready to develop it across the broadest possible spectrum of areas,” Mr Shoigu added. “We see the formation of a collective regional security system as the primary objective of our joint efforts”.

The Russian delegation also drew a parallel between the current pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong and the so-called “colour revolutions” in former Soviet states, including Ukraine, which China and Russia blame on instigation from the US and its allies.

Anatoly Antonov, Russia's deputy defence minister, even seemed to suggest Moscow would be willing to help Beijing tackle the peaceful protests in Hong Kong.

“We have taken note of the events that recently took place in Hong Kong and the two ministers acknowledged that not a single country can feel insured against colour revolutions,” Mr Antonov said, according to Russian state media. “We believe that Russia and China should work together to oppose this new challenge to our states' security”.

The two sides agreed to hold joint naval exercises, their fourth in recent years, in the Mediterranean next spring, to be followed by further exercises in the Pacific.

As fighting intensifies in eastern Ukraine and Russia's neighbours fret over Moscow's rising belligerence, Beijing has described Sino-Russian relations as the best they have ever been.

The current situation in Europe prompted former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to warn last week that the world was on the brink of a new cold war, a sentiment echoed by Belarusian officials on Tuesday.

Facing the prospect of fresh sanctions from the west, Russian President Vladimir Putin has sought to move closer to China to demonstrate he has economic and strategic options and is not completely isolated on the global stage.

China's authoritarian leaders have welcomed the overtures as they also make more strident territorial claims in the East and South China Seas and seek to face down smaller neighbours and Japan, their second world war enemy.

But both sides remain wary of getting too close and have trouble overcoming a long history of mutual mistrust and contempt, according to Chinese and western experts who monitor the relationship.

For all the talk of closer military ties and joint exercises, Russia has so far refused to sell its most advanced military technology, including jet engines and fighter aircraft, to China.

Beijing has sought to balance closer ties to Moscow with greater co-operation with the US and its allies, while Mr Putin has sought to boost relations with Tokyo, much to China's dismay.

Even as the Russian defence minister was meeting his Chinese counterpart Chang Wanquan on Tuesday, a top Chinese Communist party official was visiting Finland, which is on high alert for any sign of Russian encroachment.

At the same time, a top-level delegation from North Korea met Mr Putin in the Kremlin amid speculation the country's leader Kim Jong Un would make a first overseas visit as leader to Russia, rather than to China, its traditional ally.

Chinese officials say ties between Pyongyang and Beijing have reached an all-time low since Mr Kim took over the hermit kingdom and particularly since he executed his uncle, Jang Song Thaek, who was seen as China's key contact in the country.

During the defence minister's visit, Russia's federal space agency also discussed closer co-operation with China, which is interested in building Russian rocket engines and joining manned space exploration, remote sensing and navigation satellite projects, according to Russian state media.

#### **Sino-Russian postwar relations: from rocky to robust**

1950 – Mao Zedong travels to Moscow to sign a Treaty of Friendship, which consists of a \$300m loan to help rebuild the newly-born but war-ravaged People's Republic of China, and a military alliance against Japanese aggression.

1960 – After several years of tensions, in part down to divergences in Marxist ideology, relations collapse. This Sino-Soviet split come to be seen as one of the key events in the Cold War.

1969 – Tensions flare in an undeclared seven-month-long border conflict that brings the PRC and Soviet Union to the brink of war.

1972 – The visit to China by President Richard Nixon results in the first meeting between US and Chinese leaders for 25 years. The revival in political and trade ties moves China closer to the west, and away from Moscow.

1980s – After a prolonged freeze, Soviet and Chinese leaders make a series of conciliatory gestures aimed at restoring political relations.

1991 – Diplomatic relations between Beijing and Moscow dramatically improve following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

1996 – China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan form the foundations of a political, economic and military organization, later renamed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization when Uzbekistan joins in 2001.

2010 – China and Russia announce they will use their own national currencies for bilateral trade rather than the US dollar. Separately, a 1,000km crude oil pipeline is completed – the first between Russia and China.

2014 – Russia's Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping meet at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Beijing and sign a \$400 bn gas deal. Weeks later the pair pledge to hold joint naval exercises in the Mediterranean Sea and work towards stronger military cooperation.

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## **Fuerte impulso al comercio de caballos en pie**

Dangdai–27/11/2014

El ministro de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca, Carlos Casamiquela, suscribió ayer con su



par de China, Han Changfu, el Memorando de Entendimiento (MOU) en materia de cooperación e intercambio para promover y fomentar la industria hípica, en el marco de la 2° Reunión del Comité Mixto Agrícola China-Argentina. El logro se suma a la reciente apertura del mercado de exportación de sorgo forrajero a China, como ya se informara aquí.

Según un comunicado del Ministerio, hubo también avances en materia de girasol confitero, peras, manzanas y carne deshuesada. A su vez Casamiquela recorrió el pabellón argentino de lácteos de la Feria World of Foods (Anuga) y China International Dairy & Food Expo 2014. Ambas ferias son reconocidas como dos de los eventos más importantes vinculados a fomentar la comercialización de productos alimenticios en China.

En cuanto al tema caballos, el objetivo del Memorando consiste en continuar impulsando el desarrollo del comercio de animales en pie y servicios relacionados a la hípica entre ambos países, luego de la firma en mayo de 2013 del Protocolo Sanitario para la exportación de caballos a China.

Casamiquela estuvo acompañado por el jefe de Gabinete del MAGyP, Héctor Espina, el secretario de Coordinación Político-Institucional y Emergencia Agropecuaria, Javier Rodríguez; la presidenta del SENASA, Diana Guillen; la directora nacional Asistente de Relaciones Interministeriales del INTA, Ana Cipolla; el consejero agrícola en la Embajada Argentina en la República Popular China, Omar Odarda, y la coordinadora de Gabinete de la Subsecretaría de Coordinación Política del MAGyP, Julia Souto.

Entre los temas abordados, dice la información, se destacó la iniciativa de realizar la conformación de un grupo de trabajo en sanidad animal vinculado al comercio internacional de productos de la ganadería, en el marco del MOU en Materia de Cooperación Veterinaria (2014), a fin de darle continuidad a los trabajos comenzados en torno a los protocolos e informes técnicos que fueron presentados por el MAGyP, creando de este modo un mecanismo de diálogo institucionalizado.

“Este grupo puede además aprovechar la mayor capacidad institucional derivada de la eventual creación por Ley Nacional del Instituto de Promoción de la Carne Argentina (IPCA), actualmente en tratamiento en el Honorable Congreso de la Nación”, destacó Casamiquela.

Asimismo, ambas partes convinieron crear un Plan de Trabajo en materia Forestal en el marco del Memorando vigente entre el MAGyP y la Administración Forestal Estatal suscripto en el año 2008, a fin de lograr avanzar en materia de cooperación en la temática, y se acordó impulsar las reuniones de diversos grupos de trabajo como Siembra Directa, Ganadería, Sanidad Animal, Comercio e Inversión.

Han Changfu estuvo acompañado por el jefe económico de la Oficina General, BI Meijia; los directores generales del Departamento de Cooperación Internacional, Wang Ying; del Departamento de Ciencia, Tecnología y Educación, Tang Ke; del Departamento de Administración de Plantación, Zeng Yande; del Buró de Administración de Semillas, Zhang Yangiu; del Departamento de Ganadería, Wang Zhicai del Buró Veterinario, Zhang ZHonggiu; del Buró de Granjas Estatales, Wang Shoucong; del Buró de Administración de la Pesca, Zhao Xingwu; el vicepresidente de la Academia de Ciencias Agrícolas de China, Wu Kongming y el subdirector general del Departamento de Cooperación Internacional, Xie Jianmin.

### Lechería

Acompañado por el subsecretario de lechería, Arturo Videla, el titular de la cartera agropecuaria se reunió con representantes de la Asociación de las Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas Lácteas (APyMEL), que gracias al apoyo del Estado nacional están promocionando sus productos en China, con el fin de incrementar sostenidamente la colocación de productos nacionales con alto valor agregado en origen en el mercado asiático.

APyMEL nuclea a 234 empresas que elaboran un total de 4.880.000 litros por día y emplean cerca de 4000 personas, y cuenta con una plataforma de exportación que comenzó a funcionar en 2012 y tiene como objetivo promover entre la exportación de las PyMEs como un medio para fortalecer las empresas, las economías locales, el asociativismo, la industria láctea argentina y el desarrollo nacional, dijo el comunicado.

Casamiquela mantuvo además una reunión con los directores de Anuga quienes le manifestaron el interés de incrementar la presencia de empresas argentinas y sus productos tanto en la Feria como en el mercado asiático.

Respecto al sector, se enfatizó en la importancia de incrementar la frecuencia de las reuniones del Grupo de Trabajo de Lechería, a fin de agilizar las negociaciones vigentes con la contraparte asiática, como ser la habilitación para las plantas lácteas de fórmulas infantiles y la promoción de productos lácteos, con un alto potencial de exportación para el país.

Del sector de pequeñas y medianas industrias lácteas estuvieron presentes Luis Fernando Ramos, Santiago Aguirre, Lucas Pablo Magnasco, Ricardo José Aladín, César Domingo Sobrero, Yanina Soledad Bosio y Mario Cesar Rubio.

### Otras Reuniones

El MAGyP mantuvo un encuentro de trabajo con el director general de Cooperación Internacional de la Academia de Ciencias Agrícolas de China (CAAS), Zhang Lubiao, en donde se avanzó acerca de la implementación del Convenio de Cooperación firmado el pasado mes de julio. En este sentido, se abordaron temas en materia del control de barro, resistencia a fusarium, siembra directa y maquinaria agrícola, y producción animal para leche y carne, incorporando finalmente nuevos proyectos.

Además, la comitiva argentina llevó a cabo reuniones con el ministro de la Administración Estatal de Granos, Ren Zhenxiao; el viceministro de la Administración Forestal Estatal, Liu Dongsheng y participó de la 1° Reunión del Grupo de Trabajo de Lechería.

Desde el año 2004 hasta la fecha Argentina y China han firmados 11 Memorandos de Entendimiento, han creado 8 Grupos de Trabajo y se ha suscripto un Plan de Acción Conjunta (2012) para la Profundización Global de la Cooperación Agrícola entre el MAGyP y su similar de China, un Programa de Cooperación entre el MAGyP y AQSIQ (2012) y más recientemente un Convenio de Cooperación Técnica entre el Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria y la Academia China de Ciencias Agrícolas (2014), como así también un Acuerdo de Cooperación en Pesca entre ambos países.

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## China desempeña un papel más importante en el sector de cobre del mundo

Xinhuanet—1/12/2014

BEIJING, 1 dic (Xinhua) -- China desempeña un papel más importante en el sector mundial del cobre, señaló el director ejecutivo del Centro de Estudios del Cobre y la Minería (CESCO) de Chile, Juan Carlos Guajardo, durante la III Semana del Cobre de Asia celebrada en la metrópoli oriental china de Shanghai.

“El desarrollo del sector del cobre de China tiene una influencia significativa para el desarrollo del sector mundial y la competitividad entre las empresas chinas es muy importante para su reforma”, indicó el experto chileno en una entrevista citada por la página web china [www.cnmmn.com.cn](http://www.cnmmn.com.cn), especializada en el sector de metales no ferrosos.

De acuerdo con el experto, China se enfrenta a muchos retos debido a un desarrollo industrial demasiado rápido y a la descentralización de su sector del cobre y sugirió que la dirección de la reforma depende del ajuste estructural del sector.

Guajardo aseguró que actualmente la reforma de China se halla en la dirección correcta y su economía afecta en gran medida a la del resto del mundo. Además, algunas compañías cambian su estrategia de gestión según la tendencia del desarrollo chino.

En cuanto a los informes referentes al descenso del sector del cobre de Chile, el experto indicó que su país ha sido durante muchos años el más importante en la producción de cobre y el gobierno chileno ha cambiado en los últimos tiempos la estrategia de desarrollo del sector con el fin de adaptarse al nuevo ambiente del mercado internacional. Asimismo, atribuyó la decadencia a problemas como la fluctuación del mercado y el incremento del gasto de inversión.

Durante la entrevista, Guajardo elogió la estrategia de “salir al exterior” de las empresas chinas y dio la bienvenida a los inversores chinos. En su opinión, la III Semana del Cobre de Asia, que ha ganado una creciente atención en el mundo, sirve como puente de comunicación para las empresas chinas y chilenas, así como para otras del mercado internacional.

Actualmente, China es el mayor país consumidor de cobre del mundo. En 2013 produjo más de 6,6 millones de toneladas de cobre fino y consumió más de 8,8 millones. Mientras tanto, Chile es el principal país productor de cobre del planeta. Representa el 33 por ciento de la producción mundial y sus reservas de cobre alcanza el 28 por ciento.

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## China: Pekín prohíbe fumar en edificios públicos y oficinas

BBC Mundo—28/11/2014

La capital de China, Pekín, prohibirá fumar en edificios públicos y en oficinas a partir de junio del año que viene.

También limitará la publicidad del tabaco como parte del compromiso de la ciudad para reducir el número de fumadores.

Se estima que China tiene 300 millones de fumadores y más de un millón de muertes al año están relacionados con ese hábito.

La Organización Mundial de la Salud (OMS) ha acogido la decisión con satisfacción, aunque ha señalado que la aplicación de la nueva norma no será fácil, ya que las prohibiciones anteriores no siempre se han aplicado estrictamente.

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## El idioma como integrador social

Dangdai—28/11/2014

Más de mil millones de personas en el mundo hablan chino mandarín y Buenos Aires ya tiene la primera escuela bilingüe china de América latina, y en 2015 incorporará su enseñanza en el Normal 10. En quince años, unos 400 jóvenes egresarían de escuelas públicas con el dominio de ese idioma, dice esta nota publicada hoy por 3Días.

En Buenos Aires hablar chino ya no es más una rareza. Se espera que en 15 años haya en la Ciudad unos 400 jóvenes egresados de escuelas públicas parlantes en chino mandarín, el idioma más hablado del mundo y que amenaza con convertirse en la lengua de los negocios en reemplazo del inglés. Este año en el sur de la Ciudad se llevó a cabo una experiencia inédita. Buenos Aires inauguró en Parque Patricios la primera escuela bilingüe español-chino del mundo, donde niños de cuatro y cinco años aprendieron las primeras letras y números al mismo tiempo en los dos idiomas y con maestras que les hablan chino y castellano a la par en el aula.

El establecimiento en cuestión es un anexo de la Escuela Infantil de jornada extendida número 11 del distrito 15, ubicada en Los Patos y Monteagudo. Bibiana Bren, directora de la escuela, cuenta que ella nunca se imaginó comandar una experiencia “tan revolucionaria”. “Es absolutamente innovador, diferente. Pensé que iba a costarnos mucho, pero cada día le encontramos una vuelta más y llevamos adelante este rico proyecto con satisfacción”, cuenta. “Hace pocos días se celebró en la escuela el Día Nacional de la República China, y se pasó el himno en el acto. Las mamás lloraban de la emoción”, recuerda Bren.

El año próximo, en esa escuela, unos cincuenta chicos comenzarán el primer grado bilingüe, y la enseñanza del chino se extenderá a los primeros grados del Normal 10 de Belgrano, confirmó a 3Días Carlos Regazzoni, subsecretario de Gestión Económica del Ministerio de Educación de la Ciudad. En el tradicional colegio de Belgrano empezarán con 10 horas de chino mandarín semanales y con la enseñanza de música y educación artística china. “Es un sistema de escritura único en el mundo que utiliza ideogramas. Es, además, una ventana al pasado y una experiencia cultural riquísima. El mandarín tiene 7.000 años de historia”, precisa Regazzoni, uno de los impulsores de esta experiencia.

Regazzoni es fanático del chino. Lo estudia desde hace dos años. Es médico y político, pero además hijo del conocido pintor y escultor Carlos Regazzoni. “Vamos a expandir esta experiencia en la Ciudad de a poco, pero con paso firme. La gente sigue pidiéndonos francés pero, la verdad, el chino es el futuro. Es un idioma difícil de aprender, no se hace con un curso por Internet, lleva por lo menos 10 años, por eso el proyecto es en-

señárselos desde pequeños y que cuando estos chicos se reciban tengan un saber que ayudará a convertir a Buenos Aires en la plataforma económica de América Latina”.

Los maestros de la escuela infantil de Parque Patricios reconocen que ellos aprendieron mucho también con la experiencia, por ejemplo, cuestiones de la cultura china que hay que respetar. No usan el blanco en las invitaciones de los actos porque en China es el color del duelo. Hacen, entonces, todos los carteles y tarjetas de las convocatorias en rojo y dorado, los colores festivos chinos, y escriben notas en cuadernos y en carteleras siempre en los dos idiomas. Esa amplitud cultural viene, por supuesto, de los chicos. “Esta es una escuela de inserción dual, hay muchos hijos de argentinos, pero también de bolivianos y peruanos, además de chinos. Muchos papás nos cuentan alegres que los chicos saludan en chino cuando entran al súper del barrio”, explica Bren.

Gabriela Wu es la coordinadora del proyecto y trabaja en Lenguas Extranjeras en el Ministerio. “Nací en Taiwan y vine a Buenos Aires a los cinco años. A los cinco días de llegar al país, me inscribieron en el preescolar. Mi experiencia fue traumática, aprendí español por supervivencia, los compañeros me tocaban el brazo para ver si hablaba, creían que era muda”, relata. “Es reparador ver a estos chicos en su ambiente. Creo que me formé en lenguas extranjeras por esa experiencia infantil traumática y para mí esto es un sueño”, dice Wu.

Comparte con 3Días una anécdota muy graciosa: una nena de cuatro años, argentina, reclamándole a los gritos en chino a un niño de origen oriental que se detenga y respete una indicación que la maestra le hacía en chino. “Ella creía que el chico (chino) no le había entendido y le explicaba en chino que la maestra le estaba hablando en chino”, cuenta.

### Intercambio con Beijing

Este programa se plasmó como consecuencia de un convenio que el Ministerio que conduce Esteban Bullrich firmó en Beijing con autoridades de la Ciudad y el Ministerio de Ultramar, que se ocupa del bienestar de los 52 millones de chinos que viven en otros lugares del mundo. La Embajada de ese país en la Argentina colabora para ubicar a los hijos de chinos dispersos por la ciudad y también para garantizar los profesores de chino que harán falta para extender el proyecto.

Beijing y Shanghái tienen sistemas educativos que lideraron las últimas pruebas PISA. El Ministerio de Educación porteño busca intensificar el intercambio de experiencias, capacitación docente y alumnos también por esa razón.

En la Argentina hay 140.000 chino parlantes, 100.000 son de nacionalidad china y el resto hijos nacidos en el país. Aquí nacen 1.000 hijos de chinos por año. “El milagro chino no se conoce bien. Es básicamente una revolución educativa. China es un país que montó en la educación su crecimiento. Hoy es la primera potencia mundial, pero no sólo desde la economía; el 99% de los chinos terminaron el secundario, tienen la tasa de egreso más alta del mundo”, señala Regazzoni.

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**Taiwán: Dimite el gabinete en bloque tras resultados electorales adversos**  
BBC Mundo—1/12/14

Los 81 miembros del gabinete de Taiwán dimitieron este lunes tras el mal desempeño del partido gobernante en las elecciones locales del domingo.

El Partido Nacionalista perdió cinco de las seis mayores municipalidades de la isla, en unas elecciones vistas como un referéndum sobre las políticas pro China del presidente, Ma Ying-jeou.

El primer ministro de Taiwán ya había renunciado al cargo.

Los corresponsales de la BBC en la zona explican que los votantes están preocupados de que las políticas del presidente los están vinculando demasiado a China, quien reclama a Taiwán como parte de su territorio.

Los ministros del gabinete continuarán en sus puestos hasta que sean elegidos aquellos que los sustituirán.

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